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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MERLENE LODDERJ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WESTERN PAC IF I C RAILROAD 
COMPANY and RICHARD WHITE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
7809 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent and her husband William Lodder com-
menced this action against The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company and the appellants to recover 
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2 
damages sustained in an automobile-locomotive collision 
which occurred at the intersection of 2nd South and 4th :iwatt 
West Streets in Salt Lake City (Ro 1-2) o The complaint is in 
the form approved by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for :dlrui 
situations where the plaintiff is unable to determine defin-
itely whether "CD or EF is responsible or whether both are 5 ~~r 
responsible" (Form 10) and accordingly alleges that one or ::l~i 
the other of the three named defendants or any one of three 
different combinations of the defendants negligently moved 
the locomotive into the intersection and against the automo-
bile of the plaintiff William Lodder, which he was driving 
and in which the plaintiff Merlene Lodder was "present" 
(Ro 1) o Plaintiff William Lodder prayed for a judgment for 
the damage to his automobile and the plaintiff Merlene 
Lodder prayed for judgment for her special damages and 
$5,000o00 general damages (Ro 2) 0 
Later the plaintiffs filed an amended and supplemental 
complaint in which the Salt Lake City Union Depot and 
Railroad Company was added as a party defendant (R. 25). 
The allegations of negligence in the original complaint were 
repeated, as were the allegations describing the injuries 
sustained by the plaintiff Merlene Lodder (R. 25). With 
respect to the added defendant, it was charged with negli-
gence in having maintained and employed a watchman at the 
crossing between certain hours for a period of four months 
before the accident occurred; that the plaintiffs had, during 
:this period, used the crossing frequently during the hours 
the watchman was on duty and were thereby lead to be-
lieve that the crossing would be protected by the watch-
man and that a warning would be given of the approach of 
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3 
trains to the intersection; that on the night of the collision 
the watchman negligently failed and neglected to warn the 
plaintiffs of the approach of the locomotive to the crossing. 
The plaintiff Merlene Lodder alleged that as a result of 
her injuries she had been damaged in the sum of $50,000.00, 
plus special damages ( R. 25-28) . A few minutes before 
the time set for the trial the plaintiff William Lodder moved 
to dismiss his complaint without prejudice, which motion 
was granted (R. 44). 
The action was tried to a jury and at the close of the 
evidence the defendants separately moved for a directed 
verdict (R. 30-43). The motion for the defendant Salt Lake 
Union Depot Company was granted (R. 46). No ruling was 
made on the motions of the other defendants. Although all 
parties requested that the jury return a general verdict, the 
court of its own motion directed the jury to return a special 
verdict ( R. 353) . The jury answered some of the questions 
submitted to them in the affirmative and some in the nega-
tive (R. 353-6). Immediately upon return of the special 
verdict the court directed the jury to again retire and asses's 
the amount of damages. The jury assessed the damage in 
the sum of $25,000 (R. 351-2). 
The defendants, other than the Depot Company, then 
filed separate motions for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and in the alternative for a new trial (R. 362-3) . 
The motion of the defendant The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict was granted (R. 359). The motions of the ap-
pellants for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were 
denied, but a new trial, limited to the issue of injury and 
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damage, was granted unless the plaintiff remitted the sum 
of $15,000 from the judgment (R. 364). The plaintiff ac-
cepted the reduction (R. 366). 
The collision occurred at about 9 :15 P.M. December 19, 
1949. 
Second South Street extends east and west and inter-
sects Fourth West Street at right angles (Ex. A). 
These streets are each 132 feet wide (Ex. A). Four 
sets of railroad tracks laid in Fourth West Street inter-
sect Second South Street (Ex. A). The most easterly track 
crosses Second South Street at an angle of 15 degrees and 
is referred to in the evidence as Track No. 1 (Ex. A). It 
branches off from the next westerly track at a switch, 
which is 55 feet north of Second South (Ex. A). Approxi-
mately 170 feet north of Second South is another switch 
leading to Track No. 1 (Ex. A). The intersection is lighted 
by two street lights, one located at the northwest corner and 
the other at the southeast corner (Ex. A). 
The Diesel locomotive operated by the appellant White, 
assisted by hostler helper Bond, was brought from the 
roundhouse to a point near First South Street, where it was 
backed in on Track No. 1 and brought to a stop at the third 
switch north of Second South (R. 188-191). At this point 
the hostler received a signal from the crossing watchman, 
who was then in the intersection of Second South and Fourth 
West (R. 191). Bond lined the switch, gave the hostler a 
back-up signal and got on the stirrup located at the rear on 
the left side of the locomotive (R. 231). The locomotive ap-
proached the crossing at a rate of speed of about five or six 
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miles per hour (R. 198). When the rear of the locomotive 
reached a point a few feet north of the north line of Second 
South, Bond looked to the east and saw the plaintiffs' auto-
mobile approaching (R. 233). He estimated that the auto-
mobile was then about 200 feet east of the track on which 
the locomotive was moving (R. 233). When he first saw 
the automobile he realized that it would be unable to stop 
before reaching the railroad track, and, accordingly, jumped 
off the locomotive and gave the hostler an emergency stop 
signal (R. 233). The hostler had observed his helper jump 
off the locomotive and realized that some accident was im-
minent (R. 195). He applied the independent brakes on 
the locomotive as Bond jumped off and made an emergency 
application of the brakes immediately upon receiving the 
emergency signal (R. 195). 
Bond's first apprehension of a collision proved correct. 
Lodder said that he saw the locomotive when his automobile 
was about five or six car lengths (15 feet each) from the 
track, that he immediately shifted into second gear and 
applied his brakes (R. 84-9). This application of the brakes 
locked the wheels and the car skidded or slid on the icy 
street and struck the rear of the locomotive at the point of 
the stirrup on which Bond had very recently been riding (R. 
84-93) . The point of collision was 30 feet south of the north 
curb line of Second South (R. 252). The locomotive moved 
61 feet and the automobile 36 feet, both in the same direc-
tion, after the impact (R. 252). The automobile was badly 
damaged and plaintiff received an injury when her head 
struck the windshield of the auto. 
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POINTS RELIED ON BY APPELLANTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
PROVE ANY ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF EITHER OF THE APPE~ 
LANTS. 
POINT II 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT III 
NO FINDING IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDG-
MENT CAN BE IMPLIED. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUB-
MIT THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AND IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THAT ISSUE AS REQUESTED 
BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
POINT V 
IT IS ERROR TO INSTRUCT THE JURY UPON 
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW NOT APPLIED OR 
APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES AND EVI-
DENCE EVEN THOUGH THE PROPOSITIONS 
ARE CORRECTLY STATED. 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY ISSUES UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
POINT VII 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE PREVENTED 
FROM HAVING A FAIR TRIAL BY THE 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT THEIR 
COUNSEL TO ADDRESS THE JURY AFTER 
THE SECOND SUBMISSION OF THE CASE. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE ENTIRE 
VERDICT AS TAINTED BY PASSION AND 
PREJUDICE AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
PROVE ANY ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF EITHER OF THE APPEL-
LANTS. 
The defendants made demand upon the plaintiffs in 
the form of written interrogatories for a bill of particulars 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
of the negligence which plaintiffs claimed each defendant 
was guilty of (R. 7-8). In response thereto, plaintiffs stated 
under oath that the defendant Richard White was the 
engineer in charge of the backward movement of the Diesel 
locomotive and in the course of his employment (1) failed 
to look and observe in the direction the locomotive was mov-
ing so as to apprehend the approach of the plaintiff's auto-
mobile and to take reasonable precautions to avoid the 
collision which could have been avoided if he had kept a 
proper lookout as the locomotive approached the intersec-
tion, (2) failed to cause the bell of the locomotive to be 
rung as it approached the intersection, (3) failed to cause 
the whistle or horn of the locomotive to be sounded, (4) 
failed to cause the rear light of the locomotive to be lighted 
so as to shine in the direction the locomotive was proceed-
ing, notwithstanding it was dark and snow was falling, and 
( 5) that the defendant railroad companies employed a 
crossing watchman who failed to proceed into the intersec-
tion with a lighted lantern or otherwise and thus to warn 
approaching motorists, including the plaintiffs, of the 
presence of the locomotive and its movement into the inter-
section (R. 9-13). The bill of particulars further stated 
that if Richard White had maintained a proper lookout and 
thereafter exercised reasonable control of the locomotive 
he could have observed the approach of plaintiff's auto-
mobile and slowed or stopped the backward movement of 
the locomotive so as to have avoided the collision with the 
automobile (R. 11-12). 
It will be observed that the bill of particulars does not 
charge the defendants with any negligent acts or conduct 
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9 
other than the acts and omissions of the engineer and the 
crossing watchman, and further that the plaintiffs do not 
claim or assert that either of the railroads or their servants 
failed or neglected to give any signal or warning required 
by any statute or ordinance. 
ALLEGED FAILURE TO KEEP A LOOKOUT 
The railroad track on which the locomotive was back-
ing crosses Second South at an angle of 15 degrees east of 
north and south. It extends north of Second South at this 
angle a distance of approximately 170 feet, although it be-
gins to curve slightly to the west after a point about 60 
feet north of Second South (Ex. A) . A two-story brick 
building is located on the northeast corner of the intersec-
tion. The southwest corner of this building is 20 feet from 
the north curb line of Second South and 42 feet east of the 
center of the tracks on which the locomotive was backing. 
The intersection is lighted by street lights located on the 
northwest and southeast corners. The Diesel locomotive con-
sists of three units, their overall length being about 120 
feet (R. 183) . It is about 15 feet high (R. 183) . 
It was necessary to back the locomotiv~ down Fourth 
West Street in order to attach it in the proper position to 
the Western Pacific train which was destined to go west (R. 
188). The locomotive started its backward movement from 
a point near First South (R. 189). The hostler helper, Bond, 
who was acting as switchman, got off the engine to check 
the switch (R. 190). He then gave White the backup signal 
(R. 143). White operated the locomotive from his seat on 
the right-hand side of the cab (R. 190). He kept a lookout 
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in the direction the engine was backing by leaning out the 
window and turning his head (R. 190). Because of his 
position in the cab of the locomotive and the location of the 
building on the northeast corner of the intersection, it was 
not possible for White to see an automobile approaching 
from the east until it was practically to the intersection. 
He saw the automobile for the first time when it was about . 
20 feet east of the tracks (R. 194). The back of the loco-
motive was then out into Second South (R. 194). However, 
he had observed Bond jump off the locomotive before he saw 
the automobile (R. 195). Bond had boarded the locomotive 
when it was approximately 170 feet north of Second South 
(R. 240). He maintained his position on the locomotive by 
standing in the stirrup and grasping the handhold with his 
right hand (R. 244). He held his lighted lantern in his left 
hand (R. 244). He estimated that the automobile was 200 
feet east of the tracks when he first observed it (R. 233). 
At that time the rear of the locomotive was about at the 
switch nearest Second South (R. 243). Before the rear of 
the locomotive reached this point Bond had no view of auto-
mobiles approaching from the east (R. 245). The moment 
he saw the automobile he realized that it would be unable to 
stop before reaching the tracks ( R. 233) . He immediately 
jumped off and gave the engineer an emergency stop signal 
(R. 233). The rear of the locomotive was then just a few 
feet north of the north curb line of Second South (R. 234). 
The engineer responded immediately to the emergency signal 
(R. 235). He applied the brakes as soon as Bond jumped 
off. 
The locomotive traveled about 50 feet from the time 
Bond jumped off until the automobile collided with it (R. 
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246). The locomotive was brought to a complete stop with 
the rear end just about on the south sidewalk of Second 
South (R. 250). 
We ignore the omission in the pleadings of any charge 
that the defendant Western Pacific Railroad Company fail-
ed to maintain a proper lookout for the automobile. It is 
submitted that there is a complete failure to prove that 
either of the appellants neglected to maintain a reasonable 
lookout for the automobile in which the respondent was 
riding. Bond was stationed on the rear end of the loco-
motive continuously for at least 170 feet until he jumped 
off in order to avoid serious injury. He did not ·jump 
off until the locomotive was practically into the intersection. 
He observed the automobile at the first opportunity that it 
could be observed by a person riding on the stirrup of the 
locomotive. White, of course, was in no position to keep a 
lookout for automobiles approaching the intersection from 
either direction. The railroad did not rely upon White to 
keep a lookout. It stationed Bond on the rear end of the 
locomotive. where he would be in the best possible posit~ on 
to keep a lookout as the locomotive came into the inter-
section. 
The testimony of White and Bond with respect to look-
out for plaintiff's automobile is uncontradicted. It demon-
strates that the best possible lookout under the circumstances 
was maintained and that the automobile w~s actually seen 
as soon as the physical conditions at the crossing permitted. 
In the case of Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, ... Utah ... , 186 P. (2d) 293, the evidence with 
respect to an alleged failure of a train crew to keep a look-
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out for automobiles approaching a public crossing was quite 
similar to the evidence in the case at bar except that in the 
Van Wagoner case there was some evidence that the car 
stalled momentarily on the crossing before it was struck by 
the train. This court held that the evidence was insufficient 
as a matter of law to establish a failure to maintain a reason-
able lookout. 
Furthermore, as pointed out in the Van Wagoner case: 
"Even were we to assume the train crew failed 
to keep a proper lookout, appellants must still fail 
in their assignment, as assuming the truck was stall-
ed for a couple of seconds, if it is intended to submit 
this question to the jury, there must be a basis for 
concluding that the failure to keep a lookout proxi-
mately contributed to the accident * * * " 
ALLEGED LAST CLEAR CHANCE 
In order to establish a causal connection between a 
falure to keep a lookout for the plaintiff's automobile and 
the accident, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove 
that the train crew had a clear opportunity by the exercise 
of reasonable care to avoid the collision after they saw or 
should have seen that the driver was in a situation in which 
he would be unable to stop the automobile short of the track. 
No such evidence was produced. On the contrary, the un-
controverted facts are that the train crew exercised the high-
est degree of care to avoid the collision after they saw or 
could possibly have seen that the driver was in a situation 
in which it was impossible for him to stop. 
As has already been pointed out, Bond saw the auto-
mobile as soon as it was possible in his position to see it. He 
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had assumed the most advantageous position possible on the 
locomotive to maintain a lookout for automobiles approach-
ing from the east. Unquestionably, the driver was in a 
position of peril when Bond first observed the automobile. 
It was then skidding and completely out of control, Bond 
instantly realized that it would be unable to stop before 
reaching the tracks. He immediately jumped off the loco-
motive and gave an emergency stop signal to the engineer. 
The latter had anticipated the emergency signal and applied 
the independent brakes as soon as Bond jumped off. The 
application of the emergency brake automatically applied 
sand to the rails, and the locomotive was brought to a stop 
before it had cleared the crossing. There is not even an inti-
mation in the evidence that this locomotive could have been 
stopped in any shorter distance than it was stopped. _There 
was not the slightest delay on the part of Bond in signaling 
the engineer to stop after he saw the approaching auto-
mobile. He did not give an ordinary stop signal, but called 
for an emergency stop. There was not the slightest delay 
on the part of the engineer in responding to the stop signal. 
In fact, he started to stop the locomotive the moment he saw 
Bond jump off. 
It may be that the !rain crew did not give any signal 
to the driver after they discovered or should have discovered 
the perilous situation in which he had placed himself. Ob-
viously, no signal of any kind from the train crew at that 
time could possibly have enabled him to avoid the collision. 
At that time he had lost all control over his vehicle and 
nothing but an immovable object could have prevented him 
from reaching the tracks. 
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The allegations in the bill of particulars to the effect 
that the train crew failed to keep a reasonable lookout and 
failed to exercise reasonable care to stop the locomotive after 
a reasonable lookout would have disclosed the inability of 
the driver of the automobile to stop is an attempt to in-
voke what is referred to commonly as the last clear chance 
doctrine. 
This court has already pointed out that the doctrine 
of last clear chance is seldom, if ever; applicable in a crossing 
case. See Holmgren v. Union Pac. R. Co., ... Utah ... , 198 
P. (2d) 459. In the case cited the facts necessary to be estab-
lished by the plaintiff in order to invoke the last clear 
chance proposition are stated thus at page 463 of the Pacific 
citation: 
"This court has more than once cited with ap-
proval the rul~ of last clear chance stated in the 
American Law Institute Restatement of Torts, Sec. 
480, which reads as follows: 
"'A plaintiff who by the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance could have observed the danger created by 
the defendant's negligence in time to have avoided 
harm therefrom, may recover if, but only if, the de-
fendant 
" '(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation; 
" '(b) realized or had reason to realize that 
the plaintiff was inattentive and therefore unlikely 
to discover his peril in time to· avoid the harm, and 
"' (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to uti-
lize with reasonable care and competence his then 
existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.' 
(Italics added.) 
"In amplification of this rule, and particularly 
subparagraph (b) thereof, we have said that 'to 
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hold the defendant liable it must plainly appear to the 
jury that defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known of plaintiff's * * * inattention and 
after such realization or after he reasonably, had he 
been conducting himself with the vigilance required 
of him, should have known it, "is negligent in failing 
to utilize with reasonable care and competence his 
then existing ability to avoid harming the plain-
tiff." In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's 
negligence has become in a sense fixed and realizable 
and on to this state of things defendant approaches 
on to the negligent plaintiff with and in control of 
the danger.' Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 
P. 2d 230, 235, 236." 
and in the case of Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
... Utah .. , 186 P. (2d) 293, at page 302 of the Pacific 
citation: 
"The engineer or other members of the train 
crew could assume the deceased would stop until he 
was so close to the track that a reasonable person 
would know otherwise. Undoubtedly when deceased 
cleared the one tree some 20 feet from the crossing, 
it would be apparent that he did not intend to stop. 
Disregarding the testimony of two members of the 
crew that when they did see the truck clear this tree 
they gave the emergency signal, appellants' evidence 
only permits one or two seconds for the train crew 
to have taken the necessary steps to have prevented 
the accident. This is not giving the defendant the 
last clear chance. The opportunty to avoid the acci-
dent must not be a possibility; it must be a clear 
opportunity. Not even by speculation could the jury 
reach a verdict on the theory that the train crew had 
time to appreciate that deceased was negligent and 
that by reasonable means they could have avoided 
the ensuing collision. When, as in this iurisdiction, 
a train has the preferred right of way, its operator 
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is entitled to assume the driver of a car will yield to 
this preferment, and if the doctrine of last clear 
lchance is to be invoked, it must clearly appear that 
time permitted the train crew to appreciate de-
ceased's predicament, and to give warnings suf-
ficiently early enough for the deceased to extricate 
himself, or the time element was sufficient to permit 
the crew to bring the train to a stop. No such show-
ing was made here." 
These decisions preclude any contention in this case 
that the railroad employees had a clear chance to avoid the 
collision by the exercise of reasonable care after they should 
have seen the plaintiffs' automobile in a situation of peril. 
The train crew saw the automobile as soon as it could have 
been seen. There is no conflict in the evidence as to this fact. 
There was, therefore, as a matter of law, no failure to 
maintain a reasonable lookout for the plaintiffs' automobile. 
It is likewise undisputed that the train crew did everything 
humanly possible to avoid the collision after they first be-
came aware that the automobile would be unable to stop. 
The facts in this case with respect to last clear chance are 
far less favorable to the plaintiff than those in either the 
Holmgren or the Van Wagoner cases. In each of these cases 
it is held as a matter of law that the railroad had no clear op-
portunity to avoid the collision after becoming aware of the 
negligence of the motorist. No different conclusion could 
reasonably be reached in the case at bar. 
ALLEGED FAILURE TO GIVE WARNING OF 
APPROACH OF LOCOMOTIVE. 
The jury found against the plaintiff upon the issue of 
the ringing of the bell and the operation of the lights on the 
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rear of the locomotive. In any event, the evidence was un-
disputed that the bell was ringing and the backup light 
functioning throughout the entire backing movement of the 
locomotive. 
With respect to the blowing of the whistle or horn on 
the locomotive, the testimony of White was to the effect that 
the cords by which the horn is operated are just above the 
engineer's seat in the cab of the locomotive; that when the 
locomotive stopped at the second switch north of Second 
South he blew the whistle in recognition of a signal which he 
had received from the crossing watchman. Bond testified 
that the horn was sounded when the locomotive was ap-
proaching the first switch north of Second South and that 
it was loud enough to be heard for a half mile. Hilton, who 
was standing on the platform of the depot on Third West, 
heard the horn of the locomotive when it was about half 
way between First and Second South (R. 289). The plain-
tiff and her husband each testified that they did not hear 
any whistle from the locomotive. 
With respect to the crossing watchman, the plaintiff 
and her husband stated that they did not see any signal given 
by him. The plaintiff's husband says he did not see any-
body in the intersection as the automobile approached (R. 
70). The plaintiff testified that she did not see the watch-
man before the collision but did see a red light, near the 
watchman's shanty (R. 156) . This shanty is located between 
the second and third tracks a few feet to the south of the 
south line of Second South Street (R. 157). She placed the 
red light about on the crosswalk north of the watchman's 
shanty (R. 157). The watchman testified that he was on 
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duty at the crossing at the time of the collision and was 
equipped with a lantern by which he could give signals to 
train operators and motorists by either a white or a red 
light ( R. 255-6) . 
While sitting in the shanty he observed the locomotive 
stop up by the third switch. He went out and signaled the 
hostler that the switches were lined (R. 261). He then re-
turned to the shanty, called the stationmaster on the 
"dummy" telephone and then with his lantern showing the 
red light walked toward the center of the street. He observed 
the auto when it was about two-thirds of a block east ·of 
Fourth West. He signaled to the automobile and continued to 
do so until just before the collision occurred. He was stand-
ing in the center of Second South Street at the time the 
automobile struck the locomotive (R. 281). 
We shall assume for the time being and for sake of 
argument that a jury could properly find from the evidence 
above recited that the defendants in the exercise of reason-
able care should have given some warning in addition to 
that established by the special verdict and the uncontra-
dicted evidence, and that the trainmen failed to give such 
additional warning. Our contention is that the failure to 
give some additional warning of the approach of the loco-
motive was not a proximate cause of the collision. We 
further contend that proximate cause of the collision was 
the negligence of the driver of the automobile in which the 
plaintiff was riding, which negligence consisted of approach-
ing the railroad track at an unlawful and unreasonable rate 
of speed under the conditions . 
• 
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The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the driv-
er of the automobile in which the resopndent was riding 
approached the crossing at an unlawful and negligent rate 
of speed. He knew the exact location of the railroad tracks 
and was familiar with the character and condition of the 
crossing. He knew that he was approaching a place of 
danger and that engines and trains passed over the crossing 
at all hours of the day and night. He also knew that the 
street on which he was driving was covered with snow and 
ice and in an extremely slippery condition. Notwithstanding 
this knowledge and appreciation of these conditions he ap-
proached the tracks at a rate of speed which he could not 
reduce to any appreciable degree. The moment he attempted 
to accomplish such reduction of speed the automobile went 
completely out of his control. Although the brakes were in 
good condition and the rear tires equipped with chains, the 
car slid on the snow and ice a distance of 60 feet before crash-
ing into the locomotive. Had it not struck an immovwble ob-
ject it would have continued on its course indefinitely until 
its momentum was expended. It did not stop even when 
it struck the locomotive. It continued in another direction 
for an additional distance of 36 feet. From the moment the 
~rakes were applied until the automobile finally came to 
rest the driver had no more control over its movement than 
he would have had if he had been sitting at home. 
Section 57-7-113, U. C. A. 1943, provides that no person 
shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than 
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. 
The above section also provides that the driver of every 
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vehicle shall drive at an appropriate reduced speed when 
approaching rail grade crossings. A violation of this statute 
is a misdemeanor. See Section 57-7-80. A similar statute 
has been construed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
in a crossing case as follows: 
"The plaintiff was bound by the express com-
mand of the statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, § 15, as 
amended by St. 1933, c. 26, § 1, to reduce his speed to 
a proper rate and to proceed cautiously over the 
crossing. The purpose of reducing the speed is to 
afford the operator such control of the vehicle as will 
enable him to avert any danger that he might en-
counter on his journey over the crossing. But the 
purpose and words of the statute are not complied 
with by a mere reduction of speed. There must be 
caution commensurate with the perils that are uni-
versally recognized as lurking in a place where a 
railroad crosses a public way at grade." 
See Papageorge v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 57 N. E. 
(2d) 576, . . . Mass. . ... 
In approaching the crossing in the manner and under 
the conditions above set forth respondent's husband violated 
both sections of the statute. He drove his automobile at a 
speed greater than reasonable and prudent in view of the 
conditions of the street and the proximity of the railroad 
crossing. He did not approach this crossing at an appropri-
ate reduced speed because having violated the first pro-
visions of the statute he was unable to reduce the speed as 
required by the second provisions of the statute. 
Even if there were no statute making such operation 
of an automobile unlawful, the common law would condemn 
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it as a negligent operation. In Lynch v. Pa. Railroad Com-
pany, 194 N. E. 31, 48 Ohio Appeal 295, a motorist ap-
proached a railroad crossing over a strip of highway which 
had recently been oiled and was therefore in a slippery con-
dition. This strip of oiled road extended 600 feet from the 
railroad tracks. When the motorist reached a point 25 
feet from the railroad tracks he applied the brakes. The 
automobile immediately began to slide and continued to 
do so until it struck the side of the locomotive about to 
cross the highway. The court held that the driver was 
negligent as a matter of law. 
"It is to-day a matter of common knowledge 
that the presence of oil, such as is usually placed upon 
streets, makes them extremely slippery. It is very 
difficult to bring vehicles to a stop. They will skid 
and slide very easily. A condition of the street which 
is so obvious requires that a vehicle operated upon a 
street so oiled must be under perfect control. To 
drive an automobile up to a railroad crossing over 
which a locomotive or train may be caused to pass 
at any moment, at what would be a safe rate of 
speed when the street was dry, may be sheer madness 
when the street is covered with oil up to the crossing. 
It is clear that decedent made no effort to stop the 
automobile until within 25 feet of the crossing, 
and that he was then unable to stop, owing to the 
condition of the street. 
See: 
Carlin v. Thompson, 12 N. W. (2d) 224, 234 
Iowa 469; 
Davis v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 216 N. W. 
424, 241 Mich. 166; 
Boyle v. Lehi Valley Transit Co., 27 A. (2d) 
682, 150 Pa. Sup. 86. 
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It being established that the driver of the automobile 
in which the respondent wa~ riding approached the cros~ing­
at an unreasonable and unlawful rate of speed, it becomes 
a matter of pure speculation whether some additional warn-
ing would have enabled him to stop before reaching the track. 
It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to present some factual 
basis for a conclusion that some additional warning of the 
movement of the locomotive toward the crossing would have 
enabled the driver to avoid the collision. She produced no 
such evidence. 
Plaintiff made no attempt to show in what distance 
the automobile could have been stopped short of the rail-
road track at the rate of speed it was moving or at any 
other rate of speed. It is, therefore, impossible to say that 
some additional warning from. the train crew would have 
enabled the driver to stop before the collision. 
The driver admits that he saw the locomotive when 
his automobile was approximately 80 feet from the tracks. 
He actually saw it sooner because he shifted the gears 
before applying the brakes and losing control of his vehicle. 
The moment he attempted to reduce the speed of the auto-
mobile he lost all control of it. There just isn't any effec-
tive warning that can be given to a motorist who approaches 
a crossing at a rate of speed which renders it impossible 
for him to control the movement of a vehicle. It is even 
conjectural whether some additional warning would have 
prevented the driver from becoming negligent and it is 
certainly entirely speculative whether additional warning 
would have enabled him to avoid the collision. 
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It is legally impossible to combine or unite the negli-
gence of the driver of the automobile with any failure of 
the railroad to give additional warning of the approach of 
the locomotive to form the legal or proximate cause of the 
collision. There is no connection between them. The negli-
gence of the driver is the dynamic, efficient and direct 
cause, and, therefore, the proximate cause of the collision. 
The assumed insufficiency of warning by the railroad is a 
remote, disconnected and wholly speculative cause and~ 
therefore, not a legal cause of any kind. These conclusions 
are established by numerous authorities. 
Lavallee v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 89 N. H. 323, 
197 A. 816, was an action by a guest riding in a truck that 
was struck by a railroad train at a public crossing. The 
highway on which the truck was moving descended slightly 
toward the railroad tracks and was extremely icy and 
slippery. When the truck reached a point about 125 feet 
from the tracks the driver saw the approaching train 
which was then about 700 feet from the highway. The 
driver immediately applied his brakes and the truck skid-
ded approximately 100 feet onto the tracks. When the 
brakes were applied the truck was traveling 12 to 14 miles 
per hour, but that speed was reduced to about four or five 
miles per hour before the impact. The train was moving 
about 25 or 30 miles per hour. There was evidence that 
the statutory warning signals were not given by the train 
crew. 
The contention of the plaintiff that the driver would 
have stopped or reduced his speed before losing control . of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
the truck was answered by pointing out that it was purely 
conjectural whether he would have done so. The court said: 
"It may be argued, however, that if the statu-
tory signals had been given, and had been heard 
by the driver, he would have stopped before reach-
ing the crest of the grade. The answer is that the 
burden was upon the plaintiff to prove the causal 
connection between the negligence complained of and 
the collision, and the case is bare of evidence upon 
which to base a conclusion that the conduct of the 
truck driver would have been different if he ·had 
received earlier notice of the train's approach. He 
made no such claim in his testimony, and the proba-
bilities are all against it. 
"Assuming that the speed of the train was 30 
miles per hour, a simple mathematical calculation 
indicates that if the whistle had been blown at the 
whistling post 1,320 feet from the crossing, this 
would have been 13 seconds before the driver in fact 
saw the train 700 feet from the crossing. It follows 
that the truck, proceeding at a speed of 12 to 14 miles 
per hour, would then have been from 216 to 250 feet 
from the crest of the grade. The evidence clearly 
indicates that at this distance the train would not 
have been visible. Whether the crossing would have 
been in sight is problematical. It could not reason-
ably be inferred that if the truck driver had then 
heard a whistle he would at once· have stopped his 
truck in order to avoid a collision with a train, which 
was then invisible, upon a crossing approximately 
350 feet away. There is nothing in common exper-
ience to justify such a conclusion. On the contrary, 
it is generally known that truck drivers do not act 
that way. 
"If it be argued that the speed of the truck 
might have been reduced before reaching the crest of 
the grade, the answer is that there is no more basis 
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in the evidence for this inference than for the one 
last considered. In regard to the speed of the truck, 
the driver testified upon direct examination as fol-
lows: 
" 'Q. When you reached this point '(indi-
cating on plan), when you applied your brakes, 
and saw the train coming, and you applied your 
brakes, you were proceeding along the River 
Road here (indicating on plan), how fast do you 
say your truck was going, when you ,applied 
your brakes? A. Around twelve to fourteen 
miles. 
" 'Q. \Vhy was it going such a slow speed? 
A. Because of danger. 
"'Q. The danger was what? A. Ice.' 
"Having thus prepared for the danger incident 
to the icy condition of the road, which, as he later 
testified 'brought a:bout the accident, there is no 
reason to infer that he would have made additional 
preparation for meeting the train by a further re-
duction in speed, at a distance of over 20 rods from 
the crossing, if he had then heard a whistle. 
"We therefore conclude that the present record 
contains no evidence upon which it could be found 
that the accident was caused by the defendant's fail-
ure to give the statutory crossing signals. A simi-
lar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court 
of Iowa in a case having many points of similarity 
to that before us. Barrett v. United States Railroad 
Administration, 196 Iowa 1143, 194 N. W. 222." 
In Umlauft v. C., M. & St. P. R. R., 289 N. W. 623, 233 
Wis. 29_1, the plaintiff, August, was driving an automobile 
belonging to Paul. It ran into a train at a public crossing. 
August brought suit to recover damages for personal in-
juries and Paul brought suit to recover damages to the 
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automobile. The cases were tried together. The jury found 
that August approached the crossing at a negligent_ rate of 
speed and that this negligence was a proximate cause of 
the collision. The jury also found that the train was moving 
at an unlawful rate of speed and that this negligence was 
a proximate ·cause of the collision. The evidence dis-
closed that August had no view of the approaching train 
until his automobile reached a point 100 feet from the rail-
road track. At that point he attempted to stop but the 
automobile skidded along the slippery street a distance of 
75 feet before colliding with the second car of the train 
which was moving 40 miles per hour. It was the contention 
of the plaintiffs that if the train had been going at a rea-
sonable rate of speed the automobile would have skidded 
across the tracks in clear of the train. The court held that 
the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of 
the driver of the automobile and that the speed of the 
train had no causal connection with the collision. We quote 
from the opinion : 
"The plaintiffs argue that if the train had been 
proceeding at a speed of only 15 miles per hour when 
it was observed by August, he would have proceeded 
on his way and not attempted to stop. There is no 
evidence that he would have so acted. That argu-
ment is based upon pure speculation. In our opinion, 
the plaintiff's attempt to stop after he discovered 
the approaching train was exactly what he would 
have attempted to do had the train been proceeding 
at only 15 miles per hour. The jury could only spec· 
ulate as to what he would have done had the speed 
of the train been lawful and as to the success of any 
attempt to cross ahead of the train. 
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"The plaintiffs further argue that if the train 
had been running at a lawful rate of speed, the auto-
mobile with its brakes set, would have skidded safely 
across the track a second or two ahead of the train. 
\Vhen the plaintiff August set his brakes, he was 
traveling at a speed of less than 30 miles per hour. 
What his speed was at the time he hit the side of the 
second car no one attempted to estimate. The argu-
ment is based upon estimates of distances and speeds 
considered as absolute verities. In our opinion, the 
finding of proximate cause, based upon the speed 
of the train, is so speculative and is so lacking in rea-
sonable certainty, as to be incapable of being upheld. 
"We are therefore compelled to conclude that 
the sole proximate cause of the collision was the 
speed of the automobile which obviously was so 
great as not to permit of its being stopped on the 
icy road after the approaching train was discovered. 
This case is similar in some of its features to that 
of Duame v. Feltus, 229 Wis. 655, 283 N. W. 299, 
301, where an automobile skidded 70 feet into a two-
car train operated by the Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. 
The plaintiff there was a passenger on the train. 
The court concluded in that case that the negligence 
of Feltus, the driver of the automobile, 'was the re.: 
sponsible cause of the plaintiffs injury.'" 
In Hickey v. Missou'ri Pacific Railroad Corporation, 
8 F. (2d) 128, (C. C. A. Eighth), the plaintiff, adminis-
trator of the estate of his father, brought this action in-
volving a collision between a truck and a train at a public 
crossing. The public highway extended in an east and 
west direction and crossed the railroad tracks at a right 
angle. The train approached the crossing from the north 
and the truck from the east. The driver of the truck, who 
was the son of the deceased, was an experienced driver and 
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both he and his father were famliar with the crossing. 
The view of the driver to the north was completely ob-
structed for a distance of 175 feet until the truck reached 
the point 20 feet east of the tracks. When the truck arrived 
at the last mentioned point, the driver saw the approaching 
train and immediately applied the foot brake and then, the 
emergency brake. The automobile skidded upon a sheet 
of ice which extended about 15 or 20 feet east of the track. 
The automobile was coasting on a slight downgrade toward 
the track and was moving at about eight miles per hour 
when the brakes were applied and it began to skid on the 
ice. The driver said he did not know of the existence of 
the sheet of ice until the car began to skid although the 
accident occurred in daylight. After the automobile passed 
over the ice the driver applied the power in an attempt to 
cross the tracks ahead of the train. The attempt was almost 
successful, the train striking the rear end of the automo-
bile. The evidence warranted a finding by the jury that 
no warning signals were given as the train approached 
the crossing. The trial court directed a verdict for the 
defendant upon the ground that the failure of the railroad 
to give reasonable warning of the approaching of the train 
was not the proximate cause of the collision. The Circuit 
Court of Appeals held this ruling to be correct. The con-
tention of the plaintiff that the jury could properly de-
termine that the automobile would have been stopped if a 
reasonable warning of the approach of the train had been 
given was answered as follows: 
"It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff that, 
if the usual signals had been given, he would not 
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have driven the automobile so near the crossing as 
20 feet before applying the brakes. Whether this 
claim is anything more than an afterthought may be 
open to doubt. There was no testimony showing 
how far from the railroad track plaintiff would have 
tried to stop if he had heard any signals from the 
approaching train. Furthermore, it is pure specu-
lation whether, if the brakes had been applied at a 
distance from the crossing of 30 to 40 feet, the acci-
dent would not have happened just the same. There 
is no evidence in the record that the condition of the 
road 30 or 40 feet from the crossing was any differ-
ent from the condition within the 20-foot limit. If 
the usual signals had been given by those in charge 
of the train, and if the brakes had been applied to the 
automobile when at a distance of 30 or 40 feet from 
the crossing, yet, if the icy condition which plaintiff 
claims existed within the 20-foot limit extended as 
far back as 30 or 40 feet, the accident might very 
likely have happened, notwithstanding the attempt 
to stop the automobile 30 or 40 feet from the track. 
"Such being the facts disclosed by the record, 
we hold that within the rules announced in the fore-
going cases, the failure by defendant to give custo-
mary signals when the train was approaching the 
crossing, if such failure in fact existed, was not the 
proximate cause of the accident." 
In Stroud v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 243 Pac. 
1089, 75 Mont. 384, the plaintiff was riding in a truck 
driven by Harris. The truck approached a public crossing 
over a highway covered with ice. When the train came 
into view the truck was traveling only three or four miles 
per hour. When about 17 feet from the railroad track the 
driver, having become aware of the approaching train, 
applied the brakes, which caused the wheels to lock and 
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the truck to slide into and against the front end of the 
locomotive. The train was traveling about 10 to 25 miles 
per hour. No warning of its approach to the crossing was 
given. The court held that neither the plaintiff nor the 
driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. The plaintiff contended that if proper warning 
signals of the approach of the train had been given the 
driver of the truck would have been able to stop and avoid 
the collision. This contention was answered by the Supreme 
Court of Montana thus: 
"The weakness of the plaintiffs' case is that 
they failed to introduce testimony which would have 
warranted a finding that, if they had been warned, 
they would have taken earlier steps to have avoided 
the collision by sooner applying the brakes, or not 
entering upon the crossing until after the train had 
passed. Instead of making this essential showing, 
the testimony in the record leads inevitably to the 
conclusion that the proximate cause of the collision 
was the icy and slippery condition of the planking 
on the crossing, which caused the truck to skid for-
ward until it collided with the locomotive. The de-
fendant was not responsible for the condition of the 
crossing; it did not know of its condition, and was 
not chargeable with knowledge thereof. 
* * * * * 
"While counsel for plaintiffs concede that the 
collision was occasioned by the icy and slippery 
condition of the crossing which caused the truck to 
skid, he contends that there was nothing about the 
icy crossing which would have made it dangerous 
in the absence of the defendant's negligence, that it 
was a condition for which neither party was respon-
sible, and he invokes the rule laid down in Meisner 
v. City of Dillon, 74 P. 130, 29 Mont. 116: 
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"''Vhere two causes contribute to an injury, 
one of which is directly traceable to the defend-
ant's negligence, and for the other of which 
neither party is responsible, the defendant will 
be held liable, provided the injury would not 
have been sustained but for such negligence.' 
"But this rule has no application to the facts 
in this case, because, as above pointed out, there is 
nothing to show that the alleged negligent act of 
the defendant in failing to give the crossing signals 
in any way influenced the plaintiffs' actions; so it 
cannot be said on this record that 'the injury would 
not have been sustained but for such negligence.' " 
In Barrett v. United States Railroad Administration 
et al., 194 N. W. 222, 196 Iowa 1143, the plaintiff, alone in 
her automobile, approached a railroad crossing at a rate of 
speed of about 10 or 12 miles per hour. When she reached 
a point 40 feet from the tracks she observed an approaching 
train about the same distance from the crossing. She ap-
plied her brakes, but the automobile slid on the icy pave-
men until it had almost cleared the track. There was evi-
dence that the train crew failed to give the statutory warn-
ing signals as the train came to the crossing. The court 
held that there was no basis in the evidence for a finding 
that proper warning signals would have enabled the plain-
tiff to avoid the collision. The point is disposed of in this 
language: 
"* * * Proximate cause is a mixed question 
of law and fact. Is it sufficiently a question of fact 
under the evidence in this case to warrant submis-
sion to the jury? In other words, could a jury as-
sume, and could the court permit the jury to assume, 
that, if the station signals had been given, the car 
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would not have skidded over the ice onto the track, 
or that the plaintiff would have stopped her car so 
far away that the car could not have so skidded? The 
jury could not properly pass upon such question ar-
bitrarily. The burden was on the plaintiff to show 
that the collision was the proximate effect of the 
failure to give the train signals. If the record dis-
closes no evidence of a causal connection, or if the 
evidence of plaintiff negatives a causal connection, 
between the failure of the signals and the happen-
ing of the collision, the jury has no discretion to find 
otherwise. In such a case, it is the duty of the court 
as a matter of law to direct a nonsuit. 
"We cannot avoid the conclusion that this rec-
ord contains no evidence upon which a finding of 
causal connection could be based. It follows that 
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict ought 
to have been sustained upon that ground, and that 
its motion for a new trial should have been sus-
tained upon the same ground." 
The case of Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line Railroad 
Company, 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100, is decisive of the point 
that any failure on the part of the railroad to give addition-
al warning of the approach of the automobile was not a 
proximate cause of the collision and that the proximate cause 
of the collision was the negilgence of the driver of the auto-
mobile in which the plaintiff was riding. In that case the 
automobile in which the plaintiff was riding as a guest ap-
proacijed the crossing in the night time at a rate of speed 
which the jury very conservatively fixed at 30 miles per 
hour, and struck a slow moving train that had gone on to the 
crossing without reasonable warning. This court held that 
any failure to give reasonable warning of the approach of 
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the train was not a proximate cause of the collision but that 
the negligent operation of the automobile was. The only 
factual distinction betweeen the case at bar and the 
Haarstrich case is that in the latter the automobile did 
not slide a distance of 60 feet or more on an icy street. 
Other Utah cases in point are : 
Olson v. The Denver and Rio G1·ande Western 
Railroad Company, 98 Utah 208, 98 P. (2d) 
944; 
Davis v. Jltlellen, 55 Utah 9, 182 Pac. 920; 
Edd v. U. P. Coal Company, 25 Utah 293, 71 
Pac. 215; 
O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 Pac. 791; 
Edgar v. Rio Grande Western Railroad Com-
pany, 32 Utah 330, 90 Pac. 7 45; 
Anderson v. Bransford, 39 Utah 256, 116 Pac. 
1023; 
Hansen v. Clyde, . . . Utah ... , 56 P. (2d) 
1366. 
Mr. Justice Wolfe dissented from the majority opin-
ion in Hansen v. Clyde, supra. He makes a very logi-
cal analysis of the principle of proximate cause in negli-
gence cases and places the situation in the case at bar in the 
same category as the H aarstrich case. He demonstrates the 
situation in which the negligence of the driver of one vehicle 
cannot be thrust upon the operator of another vehicle. The 
situation in which that may not be done is the precise situa-
tion we have in the present case. Here, the driver of a motor 
vehicle approaches a place of danger at such a rate of speed 
that the moment he attempts to reduce that speed he loses 
all control of the vehicle, which then careens wildly until it 
crashes into another moving vehicle. Nothing that the oper-
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ators of the latter vehicle did or omitted to do caused the 
operator of the first vehicle to lose his control of it. That 
control was lost solely because of the conduct of the motor-
ist. 
We most earnestly submit that the evidence in this 
case is wholly insufficient to establish any negligence on the 
part of the defendants and that the trial court erred in re-
fusing to direct the verdict in favor of the appellants. 
POINT II 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
The special verdict in the form of questions and answers 
is as follows: 
"Question No. 1: Do you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the bell on the locomotive 
which collided with the automobile in which plain-
tiff was riding was not rung continuously from a 
point 80 rods from the intersection of Second South 
Street with Fourth West Street in Salt Lake City, 
U~h? . 
"Answer (Yes or No) No. 
"Question No. 2: If your answer to Question 
No. 1 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponder-
ance of all the evidence that the failure to have the 
bell on the engine ringing continuously for 80 rods 
was a proximate cause of the injury, if any, sustained 
by plaintiff? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered. 
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"Question No. 3: Do you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence introduced in this case that the 
locomotive involved in the collision was driven into 
the intersection of Second South Street with Fourth 
West Street during the prevalence of a snow storm 
without the whistle thereon being sounded just prior 
to the entrance of the locomotive into the said inter-
section? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes. 
"Question No. 4: If your answer to Question 
No.3 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that this failure to sound the whistle 
was a proximate cause of the injuries, if any, sustain-
ed by the plaintiff? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes. 
"Question No. 5: Do you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the light on ·the south end 
of the locomotive was not burning just prior to and 
at the time of the collision with the automobile in 
which plaintiff was riding? 
"Answer (Yes or No) No. 
"Question No. 6: If your answer to Question 
No.5 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that such failure to have the light 
burning was a proximate cause of the injuries, if 
any, suffered by the plaintiff? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered. 
"Question No. 7: Do you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the trainmen on the loco-
motive negligently failed to keep a lookout for auto-
mobiles crossing the intersection of Second South 
Street with Fourth West Street? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes. 
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"Question No. 8: If your answer to Question 
No. 7 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that had the trainmen kept the 
lookout of reasonable, prudent persons under the 
circumstances the hostler on the locomotive could 
have blown his whistle or stopped his engine in time 
to have avoided the collision after it was apparent 
to him or should have been apparent to a reasonable, 
prudent person that the driver of the automobile was 
not going to stop his automobile before driving into 
the path of the locomotive? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes. 
"Question No. 9: If your answer to Question 
No.8 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that such failure to stop or blow the 
whistle was a proximate cause of the injuries, if any, 
sustained by the plaintiff? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes. 
"Question No. 10: Do you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that there was a watchman or 
flagman on duty at the intersection and at the time 
of the collision between the locomotive and the auto-
mobile in which plaintiff was riding? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes. 
"Question No. 11: If your answer to Question 
No. 10 is 'Yes', do you find by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the watchman or flagman negli-
gently failed to be stationed in the intersection or 
that he negligently failed to signal the plaintiff or 
the driver of her car that a locomotive was approach-
ing the intersection? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes. 
"Question No. 12: If your answer to Question 
No. 11 is 'Yes,' do you find by a preponderance of 
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the evidence that such negligence was a proximate 
cause of the injuries, if any, suffered by plaintiff? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes. 
''Question No. 13: Do you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that plaintiff's husband, Wil-
liam Lodder, drove the automobile in which they 
were riding into the intersection of Second South 
Street with Fourth vVest Street at a rate of speed 
that was greater than was safe, reasonable, and pru-
dent, having regard to all surrounding circumstances 
then existing? 
"Answer (Yes or No) No. 
"Question No. 14: Do you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the husband of plaintiff 
drove the automobile in which plaintiff was riding 
into the intersection of Second South and Fourth 
West without keeping the same lookout which ~ 
reasonably prudent person would have kept under 
the same circumstances then existing? 
"Answer (Yes or No) No. 
"Question No. 15: If your answer to Questions 
Nos. 13 and 14, or either of them, is 'Yes,' do you 
further find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the conduct of the driver of the car in which plain-
tiff was riding in driving too fast, if he did, or in 
~ failing to keep such a lookout, if he so failed, was 
the sole proximate cause of the injuries, if any, 
sustained by plaintiff? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered. 
"Question No. 16: Do you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that plaintiff herself negligent-
ly failed to keep a lookout for the approach of the 
locomotive with which the car in which she was 
riding collided? 
"Answer (Yes or No) No. 
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"Question No. 17: If your answer to Question 
No. 16 is 'Yes,' do you find by a preponderance of 
the evidence that had she kept such a lookout as a 
reasonably prudent person under the same circum-
stances would have kept, she could have appraised 
the driver of the car in which she was riding of the 
danger in time to permit him to have avoided the 
accident? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered. 
"Question No. 18: If your answer to Questions 
Nos. 16 and 17 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's negli-
gence, if any, was a proximate cause of her own in-
juries, if any? 
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered." 
The issues raised by'the pleadings were: (1) whether 
the Railroad Company failed to give reasonable warning to 
motorists of the approach of the locomotive to the inter-
section; (2) whether the failure to give such warning was a 
proximate cause of the collision; (3) whether the op~rators 
of the locomotive maintained a reasonable lookout for the 
automobile; ( 4) whether the defendants had a clear oppor-
tunity to avoid the collision by the exercise of reasonable 
care after the engine crew saw or should have seen that 
the automobile would be unable to stop before reaching the 
tracks. 
It is unnecessary to cite authorities in support of the 
proposition that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
establish the affirmative of issues 1 and 2 or issues 3 and 
4 in order to be entitled to a judgment in her_favor. These 
are the controlling issues of liability, and, unless the special 
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verdict establishes the affirmative of them, the judgment 
appealed from is unsupported by essential facts. We sub-
mit that the special verdict fails completely to establish 
affirmatively. any of the controlling issues above enumer-
ated. 
First, there is no finding that any of the defendants 
failed to give reasonable warning of the approach of the 
locomotive to the intersection. 
It is elementary that in the absence of the statute or 
ordinance a railroad is not under any duty to give any 
particular type of warning at any particular time or place, 
of the approach of its locomotive or train to a public cross-
ing. The duty is merely to give what under the circum-
stances amounts to a reasonable warning. It may employ 
any means or devices at any time or place that are adequate 
to convey to motorists a reasonable warning of the approach-
ing train or engine. These propositions are well established 
by many authorities. In the case of Blackwell v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 52 S. W. (2d) 814, ... Mo .... , 
it is held: 
"It was defendants' duty to warn plaintiff of 
the train's approach to the crossing, but they were 
not required to give such warning by any particu-
lar method. In other words, a failure to warn by a 
particular method would not· be negligence if an 
adequate warning was given by some other method. 
Plaintiff concedes that she would not be entitled to 
recover on the ground that defendants failed to 
sound a signal of warning if a sufficient warning 
was given by the ringing of the automatic bell, or 
by a brakeman giving signals with a lighted lan-
tern, or if the lights at the crossing had been burn-
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ing so that the approach of the train could have 
been discovered in time to avert the collision. This 
being true, plaintiff's instruction P-1, which directs 
a verdict for plaintiff on the sole ground that de-
fendants negligently failed to sound any signal of 
warning, is fatally erroneous, in that it does not re-
quire a finding that defendants did not give a warn-
ing by any of the other methods mentioned. In 
other words, the instruction does not require the 
jury to find the facts necessary to constitute a 
failure to warn." 
Michael v. C. B. & Q. Railroad Company, 131 
N. W. 892, 146 Wis. 466; 
Nicholas v. C. B. & Q. Railroad Company, 100 
N. W. 1115, 125 Iowa 236; 
Fish v. So. Pacific Railroad, 143 P. (2d) 917, 
... Ore ..... 
The finding that the locomotive was driven into the 
intersection during the prevalence of a snow storm without 
the whistle thereon being sounded just prior to the entrance 
of the locomotive into the intersection is at most a finding 
that a particular kind of warning signal was not given at a 
particular spot. It falls far short of a determination that 
reasonable warning of the approach of the locomotive to the 
crossing was not given. Furthermore, it is almost incon-
ceivable how the blowing of the whistle just prior to the 
entry of the locomotive into the intersection could have 
afforded any effective warning to anyone. 
The findings with respect to the conduct of the watch-
man are likewise insufficient to support the judgment, be-
cause they, at most, determine merely that a specified signal 
was not given by a specified individual. There is no statute 
which requires a railroad to maintain a watchman at any 
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crossing or intersection in this state. There is likewise no 
ordinance which requires that a watchman be stationed at 
the crossing where the accident occurred nor is there any 
statute or ordinance requiring a watchman to give any 
warning or any signals of the approach of a train or loco-
motive to a highway. The findings with respect to the 
watchman and his failure to signal the plaintiffs fall far 
short of a finding that the defendants failed to give reason-
able warning of the approach of the locomotive. 
It is unnecessary to consider whether the findings with 
respect to the watchman might be sufficient to sustain a 
judgment against him. He was not a party to the action and 
no judgment has been rendered against him. 
We submit that the findings with respect to the watch-
man do not even determine that he failed to signal the 
plaintiffs of the approach of the locomotive. Finding No. 
11 is to the effect that the watchman negligently failed to 
be stationed in the intersection or that he negligently failed 
to signal the plaintiffs that the locomotive was approaching 
the intersection. This finding incorporates two distinct 
propositions in the alternative. Since it is a finding that the 
watchman failed to station himself in the intersection or 
that he failed to give a signal to the plaintiffs, neither 
omission is established. The finding, destroys itself. 
Second, there is no finding that a failure to give a 
reasonable warning of the approach of the locomotive was 
a proximate cause of the collision. Since there was no 
determination of a failure to give reasonable warning, that 
omission is fatal to the judgment. There is nothing to which 
proximate cause could attach. 
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It remains to be considered whether the findings with 
respect to the matter of lookout and operation of the loco-
motive are sufficient to sustain the judgment. We recognize 
that the operators of the locomotive were bound to maintain 
a reasonable lookout for the plaintiff's automobile as the 
locomotive approached the point of collision. There is no 
finding in the special verdict that the operators of the loco-
motive failed to maintain such a lookout. Finding No.7 is 
merely a determination that the trainman negligently failed 
to keep a lookout for automobiles crossing the intersection 
of Second South Street with Fourth West Street. No argu-
ment is required to demonstrate that this falls short of de-
termining that the trainman failed to maintain a reasonable 
lookout for the plaintiff's automobile as the locomotive 
approached the point of contact. Any failure to maintain 
the type of lookout' described in Finding No. 7 is utterly 
immaterial because there was no duty imposed upon the 
trainman to maintain such lookout. The plaintiffs never 
claimed or asserted a failure to keep such lookout. The 
automobile never crossed the intersection of the two streets 
because it ran into the locomotive. To keep a lookout for 
automobiles at the place described in Finding No. 7 would 
be to keep a lookout altogether too late to have any bearing 
whatsoever upon the accident. The only lookout, so far as 
the train crew is concerned, that could have afforded the 
plaintiffs any protection whatsoever, was a lookout for the 
plaintiff's automobile as the locomotive approached the 
intersection. There is no finding that such a lookout was 
not maintained. 
Even if there were a finding that the trainmen failed 
to maintain a proper lookout for plaintiffs' automobile as the 
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locomotive approached the intersection, no legal significance 
could be attached to it unless it be accompanied by a find-
ing of facts demonstrating that such failure to keep a proper 
lookout was a proximate cause of the collision. Van Wag-
oner v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra. 
In order for the failure to keep a proper lookout to be a 
proximate cause of the collision there must be a finding to 
the effect that if the trainmen had maintained a proper 
lookout they would have seen the automobile in a situation 
of peril in ample time to have brought the locomotive to a 
stop before it reached the point of collision or that the train 
crew could have given the plaintiffs an effective warning in 
time to have enabled them to stop the automobile before it 
reached the tracks on which the locomotive was being oper-
ated. This finding must establish that the train crew had a 
clear-cut opportunity to stop the locomotive or give the 
signal in time to enable the plaintiffs to stop the automobile 
and thus avoid the collision. Again quoting from the Van 
Wagoner case: 
"* * * The opportunity to avoid the acci-
dent must not be a possibility; it must be a clear 
opportunity. Not even by speculation could the jury 
reach a verdict on the theory that the train crew 
had time to appreciate that deceased was negligent 
and that by reasonable means they could have avoid-
ed the ensuing collision. When, as in this jurisdic-
tion, a train has the preferred right of way, its op-
erator is entitled to assume the driver of a car will 
yield to this preferment, and if the doctrine of last 
clear chance is to be invoked, it must clearly appear 
that time permitted the train crew to appreciate 
deceased's predicament, and to give warnings suf-
ficiently early enough for the deceased to extricate 
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himself, or the time element was sufficient to permit 
the crew to bring the train to a stop." 
The answer of the jury to Question No. 8 that if the 
trainman had kept the lookout of a reasonably prudent 
person under the circumstances, the hostler could have blown 
his whistle or stopped his engine in time to avoid the col-
lision after it was apparent to him, or should have been 
apparent to him, that the motorist was not going to stop 
before driving into the path of the locomotive is a total 
nullity and affords no support whatever to the judg-
ment. It fails entirely to determine that the train crew 
had a clear or any opportunity to avoid the collision by the 
exercise of reasonable care after they knew or should have 
known that the driver would be unable to extricate himself 
from a dangerous situation. 
The futility of Finding No. 8 is made more obvious by 
the alternative proposition embraced in it. It says that if 
the trainman had kept a reasonable lookout, the hostler 
could have done two alternative acts; (a) he could have 
blown his whistle, or (b) stopped his engine in time to avoid 
the collision. Obviously, the blowing of the whistle after 
the train crew saw the peril of the automoble was much too 
late to avoid any benefit to either the driver or the plaintiff. 
The answer to Question No. 9 is likewise an utterly 
irrelevant finding. If the train crew had a clear opportunity 
to avoid the collision by the exercise of reasonable care after 
they should have seen the perilous situation of the auto-
mobile, their failure to exercise such care must necessarily 
have been the proximate cause of the collision, but since there 
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is no such finding, the conclusion of the jury that "such 
failure to stop or blow the whistle was a proximate cause of 
the injuries" is entirely immaterial. · 
Section 104-25-1, U. C. A. 1943, defines a special verdict 
as that by which the jury finds the facts, only leaving the 
judgment to the court, and provides that such verdict must 
present the conclusions of fact as established by the evidence 
and that those conclusions of fact must be so presented that 
nothing shall remain to the court but to draw from them, 
conclusions of law. It is plain from the language of this 
statute that unless the special verdict determines affirma-
tively all issues upon which liability of the defendant de-
pends, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff cannot be rested 
upon it. 
See: In Re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256. 
Inasmuch as the verdict does not determine that any 
of the defendants failed to give reasonable warning of the 
approach of the locomotive to the crossing or that the men 
in charge of the locomotive failed to keep a proper lookout 
for the plaintiffs' automobile or failed to exercise reason-
able care to avoid the collision after a reasonable lookout 
would have disclosed to them that the automobile could not 
be stopped short of the railroad track or that any of the 
omissions stated were the proximate cause of the collision, 
it is fatally insufficient to support the judgment rendered. 
POINT III 
NO FINDING IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDG-
MENT CAN BE IMPLIED. 
It has been demonstrated that the special verdict does 
not determine the controlling issues of liability and is in-
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sufficient to support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
There is no statute in this state which supplies a determina-
tion of the omitted issues. The trial court made no finding 
either for or against the plaintiff upon the omitted issues. 
Undoubtedly the respondent will rely upon Rule 49 (a) of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure to supply the insufficiency of 
the verdict. 
That rule in substance provides that if the court omits 
any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or the evidence, 
each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue 
so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its 
submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such 
demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do 
so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accordance 
with the judgment on the special verdict. 
There are several reasons why this rule cannot be in-
voked to bridge the gap in the special verdict. 
First, it is observed that no implied finding can be 
indulged upon an issue not supported by the evidence. We 
have demonstrated that the omitted issues were not sup-
ported by the evidence and that as matter of law the alleged 
failure of the engineman to give additional warning of the 
approach of the locomotive was not a proximate cause of 
the collision. But even if this court were to hold otherwise, 
Rule 49 (a) cannot be used to cure the insufficiency of the 
verdict. 
In such an unlooked-for event, the case would stand 
in this position: The trial court of its own motion and over 
the protest in effect of all parties required the jury tore· 
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turn a special verdict. This verdict was prepared by the 
trial judge without any suggestion or assistance of counsel 
of either party. In so doing, he failed to submit to the jury 
the issue raised by the pleadings of whether the defendants 
failed to give reasonable warning of the approach of the 
locomotive or whether such failure, if any, was a proximate 
cause of the collision. Consistently with their position and 
contentions throughout the trial, the defendants did not re-
quest that either of these issues be submitted to the jury. 
Had they made any such request, they would thereby have 
admitted, at least impliedly, that these issues were issues of 
fact for the jury. Certainly, such a request by the defendants 
would be utterly inconsistent with their position that there 
were no issues of fact for the jury. 
But suppose it turns out that these were issues of fact, 
can Rule 49 (a) be invoked to supply an adjudication of these 
issues in favor of the plaintiff? It is certain that they have 
not been adjudicated by the jury, or by the trial court for 
that matter. 
It is significant that the plaintiff made no request to 
have these issues submitted to the jury, although she is the 
one who demanded a jury trial. The burden rested upon her 
to prove the affirmative of those issues. Does she not, by 
failing to request that these issues upon which she had the 
burden of proving be submitted to the jury, do more than 
merely waive her right to have them adjudicated by the 
jury? Does she not by such failure, in effect confess that 
she has failed to present any evidence sufficient to make 
the issues of fact? We submit that Rule 49 (a), rightly 
construed, requires affirmative answers to these questions. 
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In other words, if a party fails to request the submission to 
the jury of issues upon which he has the burden of proof, 
he not only waives his right to trial by jury of those issues, 
but actually abandons them. Having abandoned the issue, 
no adjudication of it in his favor can be made by the court 
or implied by the appellate court. Any other interpretation 
of Rule 49 (a) would, we submit, render it invalid by mak-
ing it a rule of law instead of a rule of practice or pro-
cedure. 
In the State of Texas there has long been in force a 
statute which, though frequently amended, embraces essen-
tially the provisions of Rule 49 (a). As will appear from 
the cases cited below, the statute provides that when a case 
is submitted on special verdict all issues made by the plead-
ings and evidence must be submitted, and that the failure 
to submit an issue shall not be deemed a ground for reversing 
of the judgment, unless its submission has been requested 
in writing by the party complaining of the judgment, and 
that on appeal or writ of error an issue not submitted and not 
requested is deemed to be found by the court in such man-
ner as to support the judgment, if there is evidence to 
sustain such finding. The Supreme Court of Texas has 
several times construed this statute to mean that no finding 
of fact can be made by· the court or be implied in support 
of a judgment in favor of a party who has failed to request 
the submission to the jury of an essential issue upon which 
he has the burden of proof. See: 
Wichita Falls and Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Pepper, 
135 S. W. (2d) 79, ... Tex .... ; 
Ormsby v. Ratcliffe, 1 S. W. (2d) 1085, 117 Tex. 
242; 
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Colbert v. Dallas Jo'int Stock Land Bank, 102, 
S. \V. (2d) 1031, 129 Tex. 235. 
We quote from lVichita Falls & Oklahoma Railway 
Company v. Pepper as follows: 
"The fundamental principle underlying the con-
struction of Art. 2190 is that in a case tried before 
a jury each litigant has the legal right to have the 
jury pass upon the ultimate or essential issues of 
fact raised by the pleadings and the evidence, and 
findings made by the jury thereon, sufficient to 
form the basis of a judgment. The power of the 
judge to make findings where none are submitted 
or requested does not extend to ultimate or essential 
issues which are necessary to base a judgment there-
on, or to independent grounds of recovery or de-
fense. A party may waive an issue upon which he 
relies for recovery or defense, by failing to request 
its submission. \Ve find no language in Art. 2190 
which places the duty on the plaintiff to present 
defensive issues which would support a judgment 
for the defendant; and no duty rests on the defend-
ant to present such issues as are essential to a re-
covery by the plaintiff. In such case, if the party 
has failed to request for submission such issue, or 
issues, as will sustain his action or defense, he has 
not met the burden placed upon him by law, and no 
waiver can be imputed to the other party for such 
failure." 
We emphasize that the rule does not provide that a 
finding of fact essential to the support of the judgment can 
be implied. Only such findings as are in accord with the 
judgment may be implied. This carefully considered 
language of the rule was obviously designed to preclude the 
implication of any finding essential or indispensable to the 
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support of the judgment. Such interpretation of the rule 
makes it what it purports to be, namely, a rule of procedure 
and not a principle of substantive law. 
Another convincing reason why no finding in support of 
the judgment can be implied by virtue of Rule 49 (a) is 
that the defendants had no opportunity to prepare any issues 
for submission to the jury or to prepare any requests for 
explanation or instructions covering any special issues. The 
conduct of the trial of this case is suigeneris. The parties 
concluded the presentation of their evidence late in the 
evening of December 6 (R. 306). The court announced that 
the trial would resume at 9 o'clock the next morning. Both 
sides submitted requested instructions for a general verdict. 
The defendants filed separate motions for a directed verdict. 
None of the parties requested that any special interrogatories 
or issues be submitted. 
The trial resumed promptly at 9 o'clock the next morn-
ing, not in open court but in the Judge's chambers. Here 
for the first time the form of the verdict and the court's 
determination to require a special verdict were made known 
to the defendants' counsel. While we do not undertake to 
speak for the plaintiff's counsel, it would appear from the 
record that they too for the first time learned of the special 
verdict. Defendants' counsel protested against the submis-
sion to the jury of the entire special verdict. He attempted 
to state his theory of the case to the court but was summarily 
interrupted (R. 307). He did object to each of the inter-
rogatories but was informed by the court that he could take 
his exceptions later. When he attempted to point out that 
conceivably there might be an issue as to whether or not 
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the negligence of the driver of the automobile and the icy 
condition of the street were the proximate cause of the 
accident, the suggestion was brushed aside. The court in-
sisted that the issue of proximate cause was covered by 
questions 13, 14 and 15. After some brief discussion between 
the court, counsel for plaintiff and counsel for the Depot 
Company, in which the court elaborated somewhat on a 
wholly erroneous theory of proximate cause, the court pro-
ceeded to read the special verdict to the jury. 
If Rule 49 (a) has the effect of supplying a finding 
of fact in favor of the plaintiff upon the issues of liability 
not submitted to the jury under the circumstances of the 
trial of this action, it ceases to be a rule of procedure and 
becomes a device by which a trial court can deprive a party 
of all semblance of a fair hearing. It would make of it a 
weapon in the hands of the trial court whereby he could 
take over both the prosecution and the defense of an action 
and conduct the trial without regard to any of the estab-
lished conceptions of a fair trial. 
We recognize that the rule does not require that the 
court give any notice of its intention to require a special 
verdict. Such notice is, however, indispensable to a fair 
trial and must be read into the rule. Such a requirement is 
read into statutes which require that special verdicts re-
quested by one party shall be served upon the other. 
In Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. R. Company v. Smith, 
69 N. E. 873, ... Ill. ... , which was a crossing case, the 
trial court submitted a special interrogatory without having 
advised counsel for the plaintiff beforehand that such special 
interrogatory would be presented. The defendant's counsel 
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thus had no opportunity to study the special interrogatory 
or offer for submission other interrogatories. The jury an-
swered the interrogatory unfavorably to the defendant, and 
the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the ruling of the 
trial court in submitting the special interrogatory without 
first having given the defendant the opportunity to prepare 
for submission additional interrogatories. The Illinois Prac-
tice Act required the submission of special interrogatories 
when requested by any of the parties, but required the de-
manding counsel to serve the interrogatories upon counsel 
for the other side. The decision of the court in part reads~ 
"It is true that the Legislature did not see fit to 
command the court; but every reason which could 
have moved them to require the adverse party to sub-
mit an interrogatory applies with equal force where 
the same interrogatory is propounded by the court 
without a request, and we would scarcely adopt a rule 
of practice that a court might be less fair and just to 
a litigant than the statute requires his adversary 
to be. If it should be held proper practice for 
the court, of its own motion, to give an interrogatory J 
without notice to parties, they would be deprived 
of. the opportunities which the statute secures to 
them, for the mere reason that the court gives the 
interrogatory:" 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUB-
MIT THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AND IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THAT ISSUE AS REQUESTED 
BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
The court did submit in questions 16, 17 and 18 the 
question whether the plaintiff negligently failed to keep a 
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lookout for the approach of the locomotive and whether she 
could have apprised the driver of the danger in time to per-
mit him to have avoided the accident if she had kept such 
lookout. The court also submitted the question whether, if 
the answers to questions 16 and 17 were yes, whether the 
plaintiff's negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of her 
injuries. 
These questions obviously do not submit the issue of 
whether the plaintiff was negligent or whether her negli-
gence, if any, contributed to the collision. They submitted 
only the question of whether she failed to keep a reasonable 
lookout for the automobile and whether such lookout would 
have enabled her to warn the driver in time to permit him 
to avoid the accident. It was the duty of the plaintiff to 
exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision. Reasonable 
care involves something more than merely keeping a look-
out. She was entirely familiar with the crossing and with 
the condition of the street over which she was riding. She 
was also fully aware of the speed at which the automobile 
approached the crossing. A jury could most certainly pro-
perly determine that the exercise of reasonable care would 
have prompted her to protest against the unreasonable and 
unlawful rate of speed at which her husband was approach-
ing the tracks. She was sitting in the front seat next to 
the driver, who was her husband. A jury could rightly say 
that she should have warned the driver not only of the danger 
presented by the approaching locomotive but also the danger 
inherent in his excessive speed. 
In Morris v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 163 N. W. 799, 
101 Neb. 479, the plaintiff was riding as a guest in an auto-
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mobile which was struck by a train at a public crossing 
with which he was familiar. He was held guilty of contri-
butory negligence in failing to caution the driver to slow 
down. The court said : 
"In the present case plaintiff was not charged 
with the responsibility of driving the automobile. 
His opportunity to be on the lookout for impending 
danger at a place he must have known to be danger-
ous was therefore perhaps better than that of the 
driver. Knowing the vicinity and the railroad cross-
ing as he says he did, it was plainly his duty to use 
every reasonable effort to induce the driver of the 
automobile to slow down or to stop the machine if 
the view of the track was obstructed. It is not shown 
in the record before us that he cautioned the driver 
about impending danger before they reached the 
track where the collision occurred, nor that he made 
any attempt to induce his companion to slacken 
the speed of the car or to stop." 
See also Phillips v. Davis, 3 F. (2d) 798; Colorado S. 
R. Company v. Thomas, 81 Pac. 801, 33 Colo. 517; Brown 
v. Alton Railroad Company, 151 S. W. (2d) 727, ... Mo. 
Appeals ... ; Tice v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 96 P. (2d) 1022, 
... Cal. App .... ; Wagner v. A. T. & S. F. R. R. Co., 292 . ! 
Pac. 645, 210 Cal. 526. 
It will be observed that the only finding which was 
made by the jury with respect to the conduct of the plain-
tiff was an implied negative finding to wit that she did not -~ 
negligently fail to keep a lookout for the approach of the 1 
locomotive. The special verdict does not even require the 
jury to determine whether, if she had kept a reasonable 
lookout, she could have warned the driver in time to enable ~ 
1 
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him to stop, because the jury was directed to answer Ques-
tion No. 17 only in the event the answer to question 16 was 
yes. Further, the jury was not required to determine 
whether the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the 
collision and injury of which she complained. It was not 
even required to determine whether her negligence was a 
proximate cause of the accident and injury, because they 
were directed to answer question 18 only in the event they 
answered both 16 and 17 in the affirmative. It is clear, 
therefore, that the special verdict does not either submit or 
determine the issue whether the plaintiff exercised reason-
able care to avoid the collision or the issue whether the 
negligence of the plaintiff, if any, contributed to the col-
lision and injury. 
No finding adverse to the defendants upon the issues 
of contributory negligence can be implied under Rule 49 
(a). This is so because the court undertook to submit the 
issue on its own motion, but did so imperfectly and er-
roneously. Further, the defendants requested that the 
issue be submitted by its Requested Instruction No. 9. Al-
though the issues might have been framed somewhat dif-
ferently if the defendants had had an opportunity to do so, 
Requested Instruction No. 9 clearly and succinctly stated 
the issues and requested that they be submitted. 
A statute which is in substance identical to Rule 49a has 
long been in force in the State of Wisconsin. It has been 
held repeatedly under that statute that no implied finding 
can be indulged in support of a judgment upon an issue not 
submitted to the jury where the complaining party has call-
ed the attention of the trial court to the omitted issue by a 
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requested instruction or by a request of a general or in-
formal character. 
In the case of Olwell v. Skobis, 105 N. W. 777, 176 Wis. 
308, the plaintiff alleged that she had sustained injuries by 
reason of the negligence of the defendants in chipping off 
with a chisel a piece of iron from an office building. The 
piece of iron struck the plaintiff as she was leaving the 
office, and she recovered. a judgment upon a special ver-
dict. The trial court failed to submit to the jury the issue 
whether the cutting or chipping of the iron was done by the 
defendants in the usual safe and workmanlike manner. 
The defendants requested an answer to the inquiry whether 
the work of smoothing the fron water rib was done by them 
in all respects in the usual and ordinary way generally pur-
sued in doing such work in like locations and under similar 
circumstances by workers in iron in Milwaukee .. The defend-
ants also requested an instruction that if the defendants were 
carrying on the work in the way that such work in like 
locations and under similar circumstances was usually and 
ordinarily carried on throughout the City of Milwaukee and 
vicinity general,· then the employees of the defendants were 
not guilty of any· want of ordinary care in so carrying on 
such work. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment for 
failure of the trial court to submit the issue whether the 
cutting and chipping of the iron was done by the defend-
ants in the usual safe and workmanlike manner. The per-
tinent parts of the decision are : 
"Counsel for the plaintiff contend that the ques-
tion so requested was defective, in that it limited 
the inquiry to the mere work of smoothing the iron 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57 
water rib, and also limited the inquiry to the way 
generally pursued by workers in iron in Milwaukee 
and vicinity. There seems to be much force in the 
criticism. The true test is that degree of care which 
is ordinarily observed by men of ordinary care and 
prudence, or by men generally, engaged in the same 
or similar business, under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. Guinard v. Knapp-Stout & Co., 95 Wis. 
482, 70 N. \V. 671; Rylander v. Laursen, 124 Wis. 
2, 102 N. \V. 341. But the request called the at-
tention of the court sharply to the subject. It was 
followed by another request, covering one of the 
issues thus made by the pleadings, which reads: 'In 
smoothing the iron water rib upon the north edge of 
the Hyatt light frame in front of the office room 
referred to, in the manner in which that work was 
done, did the employes of the defendants exercise 
such care as is generally and usually exercised under 
similar circum~tances by persons in the same line of 
business, engaged in doing similar work.' This re-
quest is not as concise as it might have been, but 
it covered one of the issues in the case. 
"Counsel for the defendant sought to have the 
question mentioned covered by the jury in an in-
struction to be given under the second question sub-
mitted, to the effect that if the defendants were 
carrying on the work 'in the way that such work 
in like locations and under similar circumstances 
was usually and ordinarily carried on throughout 
the city of Milwaukee and vicinity generally, then 
the employes of the defendants were not guilty of 
any want of ordinary care in so carrying on such 
work, and although an injury did result to the plain-
tiff, yet, nevertheless, if you find that said employes 
of defendants were carrying on the work in the 
usual and ordinary way of carrying on such work 
under similar circumstances, your answer to the 
second question will be no.' \\Thile such instruction 
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would have been defective in so far as it limited 
the inquiry to Milwaukee and vicinity, as already 
indicated, yet it served to call the attention of the 
court again to the question so at issue and not sub-
mitted to the jury. We must hold that the failure 
to submit such question to the jury was error." 
In Wawrzyniakowski v. Hoffman & Billings Mfg. Co., 
131 N. W. 429, 146 Wis. 153, the defendant called the court's 
attention to the omitted issue by a request improper in form 
and by a requested instruction to the jury upon the issue. 
The Supreme Court held that the omission to submit the 
proper issue was sufficiently called to the court's attention 
by the improper request and by the request for instruction 
and that the judgment which rested upon a special verdict 
could not be sustained because of the omission to submit to 
the jury a material issue. The court pointed out: 
"The duty of framing a special verdict, how-
ever, devolves upon the court. Its attention was 
sharply called to the issue which the defendant de-
sired to have submitted, although not in exact lan-
guage. Under these circumstances it was the duty 
of the court to frame and propound the correct 
question. It is so decided in Olwell v. Skobis, supra." 
It was also error for the court to refuse to instruct the 
jury upon the issue of contributory negligence as requested 
by the defendants. Rule 49 (a) specifically provides that 
when a cause is submitted upon special verdict "the court 
shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction con-
cerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to 
enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue." We 
submit that where the trial court upon its own motion, with-
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out notice to the parties and over their protests, submits a 
case to the jury for a special verdict, it is error to fail to 
properly instruct the jury upon each special issue, even 
without any request by the parties. 
In any event, in the circumstances of this case the 
trial judge may not properly refuse to grant a requested 
instruction merely because it may have some inaccuracies 
and may be subject to verbal criticism. If it is a substantially 
correct statement of law and is applicable to the facts, it or 
some similar instruction must be given. 
It will be observed that the statute also requires the 
court to instruct the jury upon the law applicable to the 
case ( 104-24-14, par. 4). In the case of Smith v. Lenzi, 
74 Utah 362, 279 Pac. 893, it is said: 
"We have frequently held that the statute re-
quires the court to instruct upon the law applicable 
to the case. Upon a question so essential to a proper 
determination, and so clearly within the issues made 
by the pleadings, it is the duty of the court to in-
struct. This duty cannot be avoided because a re-
quest fairly calling the attention of the court to the 
principle of law may also contain some language in 
addition to the statement of the legal principle 
which may be subject to the criticism of being ar-
gumentative. Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68 Utah 85, 
249 P. 437; Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 6802; Everts 
v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 P. 1043." 
That defendants' Instruction No. 9 was a correct state-
ment of the law of contributory negligence and applicable 
to the facts in the case cannot be questioned. See Lawrence 
V. The Denver and Rio Grande Western RR Co., 52 Utah 
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414, 174 Pac. 817; Hudson v. Union Pacific RR Co., 233 
P. (2d) 357; Montague v. Salt Lake & Utah Ry. Co., 52 
Utah 368, 174 P. 871; Cowan v. Salt Lake & Utah Ry. Co., 
56 Utah 94, 189 P. 599. 
POINT V 
IT IS ERROR TO INSTRUCT THE JURY UPON 
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW NOT APPLIED OR 
APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES AND EVI-
DENCE EVEN THOUGH THE PROPOSITIONS 
ARE CORRECTLY STATED. 
Instruction No. 2 reads as follows: 
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken 
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the in-
jury and without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause, the one that nec-
essarily sets in operation the factors that accom-
plish the injury. It may operate directly or by put-
ting intervening agencies in motion. This does not 
mean that the law seeks and recognizes only one 
proximate cause of an injury, consisting of only 
one factor, one act, one element of circumstance, or 
the ctmduct of only one person. To the contrary, 
the acts and omissions of two or more persons may 
work concurrently as the efficient causes of an in-
jury, and in such a case each of the participating 
acts or omissions is regarded in law as a proximate 
cause. (The sole proximate cause of an injury is 
the only cause thereof. In order to have a sole proxi-
mate cause of any injury, there cannot be an inter-
vening efficient cause which proximately contrib-
utes to cause the injury.") 
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This instruction is a mere definition of a legal concept. 
Assuming for the moment that it embodies a correct· state-
ment of the legal principle, it was error to fail to apply it to 
any of the facts in the case. Since it was not applied to any 
of the issues or evidence the inevitable effect of it was to 
confuse and misdirect the deliberations of the jury. In 
Jensen v. Utah Railway Company, 72 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349, 
the trial court in its instructions gave to the jury abstract 
propositions of law but made no application of them to any 
phase of the case. This court conceded that these abstract 
principles were correctly stated but held that the failure of 
the court to apply them to any aspect of the case was error. 
It pointed out : 
"As a general rule a trial court should not leave 
the jury to apply mere general principles of law to 
a case, as here was done by the defendant's requests. 
The court should give the jury what the law is as 
applied to the facts either stated or assumed, and if 
so found by the jury. The rule is well settled that 
instructing a jury as a mere abstract or general 
statement as to the law should be avoided, and that 
all instructions should be applicable to evidence on 
either one or the other of the respective theories of 
the parties. Instructions which are not so applicable, 
though abstractly they may be correct, are not help-
ful to the jury, are apt to be misleading and to be 
improperly applied. That a proposition may be cor-
rect in a sense, and yet be inapplicable to the evi-
dence or to the issue, is readily perceived. By the 
charge, or some of it, given at the request of the 
defendant, because unrestricted and unrelated, the 
jury could and may have taken the view that, though 
all that was testified to by the plaintiff's witnesses 
with respect to the use made of the defendant's track 
by pedestrians, adults, and children may be true, 
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nevertheless the plaintiff, a child less than two years 
of age, was on the defendant's track without right 
or permission; that she had no right to be there 
hence was a trespasser, to whom the defendant owed 
no duty until she was actually discovered in a place 
of danger." 
See also: 
Mehr v. Child, 91 P. (2d) 624, 90 Utah 348; 
Hillyard v. Barr, 225 Pac. 1094, 63 Utah 344; 
White v. Pinney, 108 P. (2d) 249, 99 Utah 484. 
Rule 49 (a) clearly means that the instructions shall 
apply the law to the facts involved in the particular issue. 
The requirement that the law be applied to the issues is 
peculiarly necessary upon the issue of proximate cause. 
The term proximate cause in negligence cases is, as pointed 
out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mil. & 
St. P. R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. Ed. 256, not 
"a question of sCience or of legal knowledge." It is a mat-
ter to be determined upon the facts in each particular case. 
See Shaffer v. Keeley Ice Cream Company, ... Utah ... , 
234 Pac. 300. 
But Instruction No. 2 does not have even the virtue of 
being a correct statement of any legal proposition. If we 
concede that the language, excluding the last sentence, is a 
fairly accurate statement of proximate cause of an injury, 
it is flatly contradicted by what is contained in the last 
sentence. To say that in order to have a sole proximate 
cause of an injury there cannot be an intervening .efficient 
cause which proximately contributes to cause the injury, is 
diametrically opposed to everything that has been said in 
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the preceding language of the instruction. The two parts of 
the instruction negative each other and render the whole an 
incorrect statement of any recognized principle of law. 
Furthermore, there was no issue submitted to the jury 
to which Instruction No. 2 could be applied. 
The instruction deals with the proximate cause of an 
injury or injuries. We are not concerned in this case with 
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plain-
tiff. There was no question but that the proximate cause 
of the injury sustained by the plaintiff was the striking of 
her head against the windshield of the automobile. What we 
are concerned with in this case is the proximate cause of 
the collision. The court did not submit any issue with re-
spect to the proximate cause of the collision. There was, 
therefore, no issue submitted to the jury to which an in-
struction defining proximate cause of an injury could 
possibly be applied. 
Even if we concede that the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injury and proximate cause of the collision mean 
the same thing, still there was no issue submitted to the 
jury to which Instruction No.2 could be applied. 
So far as proximate cause, either of the collision or the 
plaintiff's injuries, that conceivably could have been sub-
mitted to the jury was whether the failure, if any, of the de-
fendants to give additional warning of the approach 
of the locomotive combined or concerted with the neg-
ligence of the driver of the automobile. This issue the 
court did not submit to the jury. It never was required 
to determine even whether the failure, if any, of the de-
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fendants to give reasonable warning of the approach of 
the locomotive was the proximate cause of the collision 
or injury. Much less was it required to determine whether 
such negligence, in concert with the negligence of the driver, 
was the proximate cause of the collision or injury. 
We do not overlook the issue submitted in question 15 
which inquired whether the jury found by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the conduct of the driver of the car in 
driving too fast, if he did, or in failing to keep a lookout, 
if he so failed, was the sole proximate cause of the injury. 
It will be noted, however, that this issue was submitted only 
conditionally, and the jury was not required to determine 
it except in the event they answered other inquiries in a 
certain way. There was, therefore, no submission of even 
the issue of whether the negligence of the driver was the 
sole cause. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY ISSUES UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
In Question No. 13 the court submitted to the jury the 
issue whether plaintiff's husband drove the automobile in 
which she was riding into the intersection at a rate of speed 
that was greater than was safe, reasonable and prudent, 
having regard to all surrounding circumstances then exist-
ing, and in Question No. 14 the issue whether he was keeping 
a reasonable lookout. The court also submitted in Questions 
Nos. 7, 8 the issues whether the operators of the locomotive 
failed to keep a lookout for automobiles crossing the intersec-
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tion and whether, if a reasonable lookout had been maintain-
ed by them, the hostler could have blown his whistle or 
stopped his engine in time to avoid the collision. 
We have previously demonstrated that the plaintiff's 
husband was negligent as a matter of law in approaching 
:-. the railroad crossing at a rate of speed that was excessive 
·< and unreasonable in view of the slippery condition of the 
street and his familiarity with the crossing. We have also 
- demonstrated that there is no evidence that would support a 
-· finding that the train crew failed to keep a reasonable 
lookout for the automobile or that they could, by the exercise 
-- of reasonable care, have avoided the collision after they 
knew or should have known that the automobile would be 
-- · unable to stop before reaching the tracks. 
The defendants requested in their Request No. 1 that 
the jury be instructed that plaintiff's husband was as a 
matter of law negligent in approaching the crossing at an 
_ excessive and unreasonable rate of speed in view of the 
condition •of the street, and in Requested Instruction No. 8 
requested the court to instruct the jury that there was no 
_ evidence that would support a finding that the engineer 
failed to maintain a lookout or that he failed to exercise 
.-· 
reasonable care in the operation of the locomotive to avoid 
.--:· 
.~·-~ a collision with the automobile in which the plaintiff was 
-·· ~ 
_ .. ~ riding. 
Rule 49 (a) provides that when the action has sub-
mitted to the jury for its special verdict that the issues 
::>: to be submitted are those which may be properly submitted 
~~~ under the pleadings and evidence. The rule impliedly, if 
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not expressly, prohibits the submission to the jury of any 
issue unsupported by the evidence. This court has repeat-
edly held in cases submitted to the jury for a general verdict 
that it is reversible error to submit to the jury an issue 
not supported by the evidence. See: 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. (2d) 
772; 
Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 46 
Utah 502, 151 Pac. 53; 
Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. (2d) 
183; 
Industrial Comm. v. Wasatch Grading Co., 80 
Utah 223, 14 P. (2d) 988; 
Peterson v. Sorensen, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. (2d) 
12. 
POINT VII 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE PREVENTED 
FROM HAVING A FAIR TRIAL BY THE 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT THEIR 
COUNSEL TO ADDRESS THE JURY AFTER 
THE SECOND SUBMISSION OF THE CASE. 
Immediately after the jury returned its first special 
verdict the court instructed the jury upon the measure of 
damage and submitted to them another special verdict for 
the assessment of the amount of damage. Plaintiffs' counsel 
thereupon addressed the jury at length on the subject of 
damage. When the defendants' counsel attempted to an-
swer the plaintiff's argument the court prevented him 
from making any further argument or answer (R. 322, 
323, 324). The reason given by the trial judge for his 
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ruling was that the defendants' counsel had already ex-
hausted the time allotted to him at the conclusion of the 
~ ~ evidence. 
'•' :..-
\Ve do not assert that the appellants were not allowed 
to use the time allotted to them at the conclusion of the 
evidence, nor do we contend that the trial judge may not 
·in his discretion limit the time of counsel to argue the case 
to the jury. \Vhat we do contend is that the court abused 
its discretion in not permitting defendants' counsel to ar-
gue the question of damages. As already indicated, two 
special verdicts were submitted to the jury. The first one 
dealt solely with the issues of liability and did not mention 
the subject of damage. After the court had instructed the 
jury upon the first set of issues and the parties had argued 
that matter, the court submitted the issue of damage and 
gave additional instructions. There was, of course, no 
opportunity for counsel to argue to the jury any matters 
pertaining to special damages until the second verdict was 
submitted to them. Counsel for the plaintiff was permitted 
to and did argue the question of damages and was in no 
manner interrupted or restrained by the trial court. In 
that situation the most elementary conception of a fair 
trial demanded that the defendants' counsel be accorded 
; rr.:: the opportunity to present his theories of the evidence and 
iii~ to answer the .argument of plaintiff's counsel. 
e ::;::· To deny the defendants' counsel the opportunity to 
::r:-t argue the matter of damages was particularly harmful 
~ in this case because of the manifest uncertainty with re-
er 1l spect to the extent of the plaintiff's injuries and pain or 
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suffering experienced by her. The evidence was such that 
the defendants might well have contended that plaintiff 
had long ago fully recovered from any injury sustained 
in the collision and that the symptoms of pain or suffering 
were entirely subjective. He might further have properly 
contended that part of the conditions of . which she com-
plained and part of the suffering which she claimed to 
have endured were due solely to mistreatment by one of 
her doctors. She testified that this doctor has placed her 
in a mechanical device and stretched her neck. Another 
one of her doctors testified that such treatment was the 
worst treatment that could have been given to her. Not 
to permit defendants' counsel to present these vital mat-
ters to the jury is to deprive the defendants of any sem-
blance of a fair hearing. See : 
Jerrell v. N. & P. Belt Line Railroad Company, 
184 S. E. 196, 166 Va. 70; 
Moses v. Proctor Coal Company, 179 S. W. 1043, 
166 Ky. 805; 
Cooper v. Robischung Brothers, 155 S. W. 1050. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE ENTIRE 
VERDICT AS TAINTED BY PASSION AND 
PREJUDICE AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
A NEW TRIAL. 
It is appellants' position that the jury's finding that 
plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $25,000.00 is so 
grossly excessive and exorbitant and contrary to the evi-
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:..: dence that it shows clearly that the jury was influenced 
, by passion or prejudice. The trial court did, we submit, in 
'::: effect find that passion and prejudice tainted the entire 
' verdict. It should have granted a new trial. 
.... ,-:· 
The appellants view the law of this State to be that 
where a verdict is so excessive as to be shocking to one's 
conscience and sense of justice it must and should be in-· 
ferred that the verdict is the result of passion and prejudice. 
In such a case the entire verdict is tainted and vitiated and 
should be set aside. Failure on the part of the trial court 
to grant a new trial in such a case constitutes an abuse 
of discretion which this court may correct. 
Thus in Stevens Ranch & Livestock Co. v. Union Pa-
cific R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459, this Court said: 
"* * * It is quite true that, where it is made 
to appear that the verdict is excessive, and that such 
excess is the result of passion and prejudice, or 
either, the error cannot be cured by remitting the 
excess from the verdict. In the nature of things that 
must be so, because every other question of jact 
which is involved in the conrtoversy, and which is 
included in the verdict, must therefore be tainted." 
In McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 62 Utah 
>-'" 115, 218 Pac. 98, this Court made the following statement: 
"* * * We now take occasion to say that ver-
dicts will not be interfered with by this court on 
account of being excessive unless the facts are such 
that the excess can be determined as a matter of law 
or that the verdict is so excessive as to be shocking 
to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, 
prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury. 
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When a verdict is so excessive that it clearly indi-
cates passion and prejudice, a new trial should be 
granted unconditionally." 
This Court again reiterated the above stated principle 
in Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. (2d) 123, as 
follows: 
"Where we can say as a matter of law that the 
verdict was so excessive as to appear to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice, 
and the trial court abused its discretion in acting 
arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a motion for 
new trial, we may order the verdict set aside and 
a new trial granted. Jensen v. D. & R. G. Ry. Co., 
supra. * * *" 
Appell~nts contend that the order of the trial court 
requiring plaintiff to remit $15,000.00 or sixty per cent 
of the amount of the jury verdict or submit to a new trial, 
itself clearly and unequivocally demonstrates that the jury's 
verdict was influenced by passion and prejudice and that 
the trial court so found. There is certainly a point which 
a trial court may reach in remitting a portion of a jury 
verdict beyond which the remission constitutes the clearest 
and most convincing evidence that the entire verdict was 
tainted by passion and prejudice. There1 are decisions of 
this Court in which it has approved a remission of part of 
a verdict without finding that the entire verdict was 
vitiated. In some of those decisions the trial court had 
remitted part of the judgment; in others this Court itself 
ordered the remission of part of the judgment. In none 
of those decisions has the Court gone so far as to hold 
that the necessity for re·mitting sixty per cent or more of 
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a verdict did not evidence passion and prejudice which 
tainted the entire verdict. The following summary shows 
Utah decisions on this quest\on, with an indication of the 
net verdict involved in each case and the amount of the 
rem1ssion, approved by the court. 
Name of Case 
Duffy v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
218 P. (2d) 1080, .. . 
Amount 
of Net 
Jury Verdict 
Approxi-
mate% of 
Remis- Net V er-
sion Ap- diet Con-
proved by stituting 
this Court Remission 
Utah . . . . ............. $ 9,000.00 $ 4,000.00 44.4% 
Mecham v. Foley, 23 P. (2d) 
497, ... Utah . . . . . . . . . . 1,000.00 500.00 50% 
Pauly v. McCarthy, 184 P. 
(2d) 23, 109 Utah 431 . . . 50,000.00 15,500.00 30% 
Geary v. Cain, 255 Pac. 416 . 20,000.00 9,500.00 47% 
Eleganti v. Standard Coal 
Co., 168 Pac. 266 . . . . . . . . 3,400.00 1,400.00 41% 
Stevens Ranch, etc. v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., 161 Pac. 459, 
48 Utah 528 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,250.00 1,367.50 40% 
Kennedy v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 
54 Pac. 968 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,685.00 2,600.00 27% 
Baurne v. Moore et al., 292 
Pac. 1102 .............. 17,850.00 8,350.00 47% 
Shepherd v. Payne, 206 Pac. 
1098 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000.00 2,500.00 25% 
In the recent New York decision, Faubel v. Draper, 
108 N. Y. S. (2d) 15, the Supreme Court of New York, 
Appellate Division, squarely held that a great cut in a 
verdict by a trial judge itself indicated that the entire 
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verdict was a result of passion and prejudice and that a 
new trial would and should be granted under such cir-
cumstances. In that case plaintiff, a passenger injured 
on defendant's train, recovered a jury verdict in the amount 
of $240,000.00. The trial court ordered that plaintiff remit 
all of the verdict in excess of $100,000.00 or submit to a 
new trial. Plaintiff accepted the $100,000.00 and defend-
ant appealed. In reversing the trial court and ordering a 
new trial, the Supreme Court said: 
"The original verdict must have been the result 
of 'passion, prejudice or a wrong conception of the 
evidence' in view of the Trial Judge finding it 
necessary to make so great a cut in the verdict to 
the sum of $100,000. Consequently in the interest 
of justice there should be a new trial before an-
other jury." 
Another well considered decision is Tunnel Mining & 
Leasing Co. v. Cooper, 115 Pac. 901, Colo. The Colorado 
Supreme Court held in that decision that a remittitur by a 
trial court of nearly three-fourths of a jury verdict was it-
self as a matter of law a finding that t:b.e verdict was the 
result of passion and prejudice. In that case plaintiff re-
covered a jury verdict in the amount of $38,750 for personal 
injuries. On defendant's motion for a new trial under a 
statutory provision in substance the same as Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59 (a) (5) the trial court ordered that plain-
tiff remit all in excess of $10,000 or submit to a new trial. 
Plaintiff assented and defendant appealed. The Court said: 
"That right, by this provision, to grant new trials, 
because of excessive verdicts, unless influenced by 
passion or prejudice, having been withdrawn from 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
73 
the courts, it logically follows that when, under 
this particular subdivision of the Code, it was found 
that the verdict was excessive and a remittitur of 
nearly three-fourths of it was required, such find-
ing, although the iudge may have declared that he 
was not able to say that the verdict was returned 
as the result of passion or pre§udice, was, as matter 
of law, a finding to that effect, and the verdict must 
be so treated. Upon such a verdict defendant had 
an absolute right, under the Code, to a new trial, 
and the court had no more authority to deny it, or 
disregard a portion of the verdict and enter a judg-
ment upon the residue, than it had to deny the 
plaintiff a jury trial, or enter judgment against it 
without any trial at all. Still, without a verdict for that 
sum, and indeed without any lawful verdict, judg-
ment was given for $10,000 upon the mere consent 
of plaintiff to accept it. That action was a plain 
violation of law, because what the Code· of Civil 
Procedure gives, in the situation here disclosed, and 
all that it gives, is a right to the losing party to 
have, and it makes it the duty of the court to grant, 
a new trial." (Emphasis added.) 
In Plaunt v. Railway Transfer Co. of City of Minneap-
olis, 97 N. W. 433, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held 
that the size of the trial court's remission was itself in-
_ _._. dicative of a finding of passion and prejudice. The Court 
--~-: 
said: 
"* * * The diminution was so great that we 
are obliged to infer that the court below was of the 
opinion that the verdict was the result of passion and 
prejudice. It certainly was if the reduction was 
proper, and, if this be true, the verdict should have 
been set aside altogether, and a new trial granted." 
:ni~;: The Supreme Court of Kansas said as follows in 
flue:::. Steinbuchel v. Wright, 23 Pac. 560: 
L~fl: 
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"This was an action in the court below for slan-
der. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff 
for $4,000. It was alleged in the motion for a new 
trial, among other things, that the damages allowed 
were given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice. In overruling the motion for a new trial, the 
court found that the assessment of the jury beyond 
the sum of $500 was excessive. Seven-eighths of the 
verdict was voluntarily remitted by ·the plaintiff 
rather than to have a new trial. In view of the 
action of the trial court and the testimony in the 
case, we are compelled to say that the damages were 
so excessive as to show the verdict was given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. If seven-eighths 
of the verdict was rendered under the influence of 
passion or prejudice, the other one-eighth must also 
have been rendered under like influence. In such 
a c~se, the amount of damages should be submitted 
to the judgment of another jury. * * *" 
It is extremely significant that the plaintiff in her 
original complaint assessed her general damages in only 
the sum of $5,000. In her amended complaint she boosted 
this estimate to $50,000, although she alleged precisely the 
same injuries. The latter complaint did not intimate that 
she had discovered, subsequent to her original complaint, 
that her injuries were more serious than she considered 
them to be at the time of the original complaint nor that 
she was mistaken in any respect in her original diagnosis 
or prognosis. All that developed between the time of the 
filing of the original complaint and the time of the filing 
of the amended complaint was some additional subjective 
pain and distress. The verdict assessed her damages in 
five times the amount that she in effect claimed. 
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Appellants submit that the evidence shows that the 
verdict was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption. 
Although it is impossible for a court to arrive at the exact 
monetary amount which should be allowed for each and all 
~' of the elements of damage, a court may and should in a 
~~ general way determine the amount that a jury could award 
for an element of damage without overstepping the bounds 
~ _ of reason and impartiality. 
Duffy v. Union Pacific R. Co., . . . Utah ... , 
218 P. (2d) 1080. 
The elements of damage and the evidence relating there-
to are as follows : 
LOSS OF EARNINGS 
The accident in question occurred on December 19, 1949. 
Between that date and February 26, 1951, plaintiff worked 
- continuously except for a period o~ eleven weeks (Amended 
Complaint). The testimony was that plaintiff worked con-
.. - tinuously between February 26, 1951 and June 12, 1951 (R. 
··.. 165). Plaintiff also worked approximately four or five 
--- weeks between June 11, 1951 and the time of trial (R. 165-
166). On the basis of the foregoing facts it would appear 
_. - that plaintiff lost a total of approximately thirty weeks of 
work between the date of her accident and the time of trial. 
If the rate of earnings, $42.00 a week, used by plaintiff in 
. -. her amended complaint is applied, plaintiff sustained a 
/ total loss of earnings in the approximate amount of $1260.00. 
TOTAL MEDICAL EXPENSE 
The plaintiff's amended complaint alleges medical ex-
pense for services of physicians, X-rays, metal brace, etc., 
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in the amount of $220.70. The evidence, 'however, would 
support a finding of medical expense only in the total 
amount of $206.50 (R. 112, Exhibit K, R. 167, Exhibit L, R. 
168). 
Loss of earnings and medical expense would therefore 
be limited by the evidence to approximately $1,466.50. It 
must be assumed, therefore, that approximately $23,500.00 
of the jury's verdict was awarded for alleged pain and 
suffering and alleged permanent disability. 
PAIN, SUFFERING AND INJURY 
The pertinent evidence relating to plaintiff's alleged 
injuries was as follows: Plaintiff experienced no pain im-
mediately following the accident in question but only a 
stiffness in the neck (R. 159). Plaintiff described her con-
dition in March, 1950, after returning to work as follows: 
"I found I wasn't as frisky as I have been. I 
found that my neck was still stiff, my headaches 
started taking hold. I tired easier, more rapidly. I 
just didn't feel the same at all. I started taking 
aspirin. That didn't do any good, so I started taking 
emperin. Emperin are temporary relief the same 
as aspirin, but even they get so that I was immune 
to those. I took a few codein, and then I started tak-
ing phenobarbital. It seemed like the more I took 
the worse off I became. It was just a relief. There 
was no let-up" (R. 164). 
This description by plaintiff of her condition in March, 
1950, is fairly representative of her testimony and that of 
her husband throughout the course of the trial. Although it 
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is suggestive of pain and suffering to a limited extent, it 
clearly does not indicate any permanent disability. Although 
::.:: plaintiff tried to convey the impression she had gone through 
quantities of medicine, she was completely unable to show 
any expenditures for same (R. 168). 
Plaintiff produced two witnesses at the trial to testify 
:;:: with respect to injuries. These witnesses were Dr. Reed 
Smoot Clegg and Dr. A. M. Okelberry, both _orthopedic 
specialists. Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Reed Smoot 
Clegg on December 20, 1949 (R. 108). Dr. Clegg testified 
that his clincal findings and X-ray readings were suggestive 
·· evidence of a fracture in the first cervical vertebra (R. 119). 
~·~ ~ 
On February 6, 1950, Dr. Clegg took a radiograph of plain-
tiff, which showed a union of the fracture. The testimony 
of Dr. Clegg would indicate no other injuries found by 
him (R. 110). Dr. Clegg testified that he had specifically 
advised plaintiff to wear a metal brace at all times, day and 
night, and that subsequently plaintiff had advised him that 
she had not worn the metal brace at all times as he had 
advised. Dr. Clegg felt that plaintiff had progressed satis-
factorily under his treatment (R. 113). On March 6, 1950, 
: =-:· Dr. Clegg pronounced plaintiff as cured and advised her 
·~::: to return to work (R. 111-113). Dr. Clegg testified that the 
- averal{e time for healing an injury such as plaintiff's was 
·- six weeks to three months ( R. 112) . 
_ ... ,) 
--
It is significant to note that prior to the time that 
plaintiff went to Dr. Clegg for examination and treatment 
she had gone to Dr. Holbrook who put her in a stretcher 
and stretched her neck (R. 175, 176). 
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On July 14, 1950, plaintiff went to see Dr. A. M. Okel-
berry (R. 116). Dr. Okelberry found from his examination 
of plaintiff and from a reading of the X-rays taken by Dr. 
Clegg that plaintiff had suffered a fracture of the first 
cervical vertebra (R. 116). He felt, however, that the frac-
ture had healed (R. 130). His prognosis was that plaintiff 
carry on, with heat and massage, and wear the metal brace 
which had been prescribed by Dr. Clegg as much as possible 
while off work (R. 118). There was apparently no sugges-
tion by Dr. Okelberry that it was necessary or advisable 
that plaintiff, who had been working, quit work; he specifi-
cally recommended that she go on with her work (R. 131). 
Dr. Okelberry saw plaintiff again on September 5, 1950. 
At that time he found that her headaches were less fre-
quent and he prescribed a continuation of the previous 
treatment of massage and heat (R. 118-119). On the 
occasion of Dr. Okelberry's first examination of the plain-
tiff, he found nothing to indicate difficulty with plaintiff's 
neck other than plaintiff's own complaints of stiffness and 
occasional headaches and pain (R. 136). 
Dr. Okelberry had X-rays taken of plaintiff's neck on 
April 27, 1951, which indicated, he stated, an angulation 
between the third and fourth vertebrae (R. 120-136). This 
X-ray was taken of plaintiff in a forward bent position (R. 
136) . Dr. Okelberry testified that with the head in a bent 
forward position the vertebrae would naturally tend to 
separate (R. 137). It was his .opinion that the symptoms 
plaintiff complained of might have been caused by a sprain-
ed ligament in the area of ~aid vertebrae (R. 120-121). 
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On June 11. 1951, Dr. Okelberry again saw plaintiff 
(R. 122). Plaintiff at that time complained of soreness in 
her neck (R. 123). The following day a plaster cast was 
~~: 
applied by Dr. Okelberry (R. 123). 
:nat 'it: 
• · On December 3, the week of the trial, Dr. Okelberry ~ 
~~~· examined plaintiff again. He found no pain in her arms or 
t!~~ shoulders; a good balance of her head and neck; a full 
h~ range of motion; normality in the reflexes and sensation in 
Jrili the arms. He advised plaintiff to do whatever she could 
~:~~ and indicated that plaintiff had gone through about all the 
~· 1 advice he could think of to give her (R. 125). 
-1 .A. 
::c: On cross examination Dr. Okelberry frankly stated that 
a!: in his recent examinations of plaintiff he could find nothing 
~~ wrong with her aside from her complaints of stiffness in 
1!1. ~ the neck, pain and clicking (R. 139). He testified that no 
tli:r radical treatment or even necessity for additional examina-
~~ tion was indicated (R. 126). 
~~! 
·-
There is one part of the testimony of Dr. Okelberry 
which is particularly important. That is his testimony 
to the effect that the worst thing that could have hap-
pened to plaintiff was to have had her neck stretched; 
that stretching of her neck was the cause of her trouble (R. 
131) . The Court will recall the testimony of the plaintiff 
:;•;.: referred to above to the effect that on the occasion of her 
!fJ}ml visit to a Doctor Holbrook the said doctor had placed her 
il3Bfle in a stretcher and stretched her neck. 
c·8:;~ It certainly cannot be said from the evidence that 
)>~ there was any objective manifestation of disability. The 
large period of time during which the plaintiff worked 
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subsequent to the time of the accident clearly shows that 
plaintiff was not incapacitated or disabled. Neither of plain-
tiff's expert witnesses surggested that plaintiff had sustained 
any permanent injury or disability nor that plaintiff was un-
able or would in the future be unable to work. Plaintiff was 
Only 28 years of age at the time of trial (R. 145). Dr. Okel-
berry's treatment during the months of 1951 was, it would 
appear, related solely to symptoms allegedly caused by a 
sprain of ligaments in the area of the third and fourth cervi-
cal vertebrae. Dr. Okelberry described this condition as hav-
ing been caused by plaintiff's neck being stretched too much 
(R. 131). Certainly the defendant could not be held re-
sponsible or accountable for any injury caused by such 
treatment. 
The evidence utterly fails to show any permanent in-
jury, much less permanent injury caused by the collision. 
No part of the jury's verdict could properly have been given 
for permanent injury. 
PAIN AND SUFFERING 
Surely a verdict of $23,500.00 as compensation for pain 
and suffering where the evidence shows only occasional 
stiffness in the neck, occasional headaches, and occasional 
pain and irritability is so exorbitant, excessive and out-
rageous as to clearly indicate passion or prejudice or both 
on the part of the jury. It was this very consideration which 
prompted and compelled the trial court to order plaintiff 
to remit what amounted to sixty per cent of the verdict 
or submit to a new trial. 
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This Court has recently in Shoemake1' v. Floor, 
.. Utah ... , 217 P. (2d) 382, had occasion to consider the 
~:-~ question of excessive jury verdicts for personal injuries 
.t.-:. 
:.- _1_;. 
--·;..,: 
... _ ..... 
under evidence of injuries far more serious and extensive 
than here involved. Although the Court there held that a 
verdict for $9,500.00 rendered by the trial court, sitting 
without a jury, was not so large as to indicate bias or preju-
dice, it did in fact find that the verdict was "manifestly 
liberal." Had the verdict in the Shoemaker case been two 
and one-half times the size that it was, or approximately 
$25,000.00 as it was in this case, the court manifestly would 
have had no difficulty in concluding that it was the result 
of bias and prejudice. If a verdict for $9,500.00 for in-
juries far more severe than the injuries involved herein is 
"manifestly liberal," in the language of the Court, the 
conclusion_seems inevitable that a verdict of $25,000.00 
could be accounted for only and in no other way than as a 
result of passion and prejudice. Under these circumstances, 
it could not be cured by an order of the trial court re-
quiring plaintiff to remit part of the verdict. Know-
ing that the jury verdict was tainted with passion and pre-
judice and manifesting this knowledge by a conditional 
order which. required the remittance of sixty per cent of 
the jury verdict rather than granting defendant a new trial 
as requested constituted an abuse of discretion on the part 
of the trial court which this Court should correct. 
SUMMARY 
Summarizing the contentions of appellants, we submit 
If the~ 
that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that 
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either of the appellants was guilty of any actionable negli-l 
gence and that the trial court erred in denying their motions 
for directed verdicts in their favor; that the special verdict ·~ 
is insufficient to support the judgment appealed from and ': 
that no finding of fact can be assumed or implied in support l.: 
of the judgment; that in any event, the court erred in failing .. ·.· 
to submit to the jury the issue of contributory negligence: 
and in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the 
defendants; that the court erred in submitting issues un- j 
supported by the evidence and in refusing to withdraw :J 
those issues from the consideration of the jury; that the J 
court erred in its instruction to the jury on the issue of ~ 
proximate cause and abused its discretion in refusing to , 
permit appellants' counsel to argue to the jury the matter ~ .. 
of damages. Finally and without regard to the merits of j 
any of the foregoing contentions, appellants submit that 1 
the verdict of the jury is so grossly excessive as to manifest I 
unmistakably that it is the result of passion, prejudice or 
corruption of the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Q. VAN COTT, 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
DENNIS McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
LEONARD J. LEWIS, 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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